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When a disaster occurs, people tend to look at the most visible effects. It is not difficult to 
understand why; natural and human-caused disasters can be destructive events that put many 
lives at risk. There is a focus on human elements of disasters such as the death toll, the number 
of people injured or missing, and the number of people now homeless or stranded by a disaster. 
A strong enough disaster that strikes at the right time can cause untold destruction that the 
average citizen is not prepared to handle. The message often sent by media coverage after a 
disaster is that the people involved need help, and they need it as soon as possible. 
 Although the human element and physical damage of a disaster are extremely visible, 
there are a number of large-scale events that occur alongside a disaster that are not quite as easy 
to see. In every disaster - be it an earthquake, hurricane, or terrorist attack – there is an 
interruption to the activities of any number of organizations. Private companies, NGOs, and 
government agencies can all be disrupted. These disruptions can range from mild inconvenience 
to a complete breakdown of internal processes. Power outages, destruction of physical property, 
and breakdown of communications are three examples of a myriad of problems that can arise for 
an organizations during or after a disaster. It is important for organizations to have plans in place 
to react to these events and be able to continue their most essential functions.  
Emergency Response Plans vs. Continuity of Operations Plans 
 
All organizations, regardless of sector, should have two plans in place to deal with disasters. 
These plans are an Emergency Response Plan, or ERP; and a Continuity of Operations plan, or 
COOP plan. ERPs describe an entity’s immediate, short-term plans for incidents that “will last a 
2 
 
very short period of time and are brought under control rather quickly” (Loyola University 
Chicago, n.d.). ERPs lay out an entity’s initial response to an incident. An ERP will address 
issues like putting out small fires, evacuating a building, or sheltering-in-place. The primary goal 
of an ERP is “…protecting employees, visitors, contractors and anyone else in the facility” at the 
time of a disaster (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). After the safety of all 
persons at a site has been assured, the emergency itself is then dealt with. Fires are put out when 
possible, chemical spills are contained, and so on. Finally, the ERP will also contain “a process 
for damage assessment, salvage, protection of undamaged property and cleanup following an 
incident” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). When successful, an ERP will 
minimize damage to facilities and operations and allow for a quick return to normal operations. 
COOP plans are the long-term plans that an organization uses when their operations will 
be interrupted for long periods of time. A COOP plan ensures that an agency “is able to perform 
essential functions no later than 12 hours after activation of the COOP plan [and] is able to 
maintain essential functions for up to 30 days” (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 6). 
A COOP plan would be activated in the event that an organization’s activities will be interrupted 
or hampered for the foreseeable future. For example, if a factory were to be damaged to the point 
that it would need extensive repairs and could not be restored to normal operations for more than 
twelve hours, the owner would want to activate the COOP plan associated with the factory. A 
COOP plan also “reduces and mitigates disruptions to operations” (Edwards, Goodrich, & 
Medigovich, 2011) so that essential operations can continue – although at a reduced rate - during 
a crisis. Continuing the above example, if the factory owner’s COOP plan calls for the temporary 
activation of an alternate site for production, operations can be continued at that location until the 
original site has been recovered. 
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ERPs and COOP plans are absolutely critical for any organization to have. They do not 
need to be complex documents spanning hundreds of pages, but they should have enough detail 
to guide the organization’s employees through a disaster situation. It is also important that the 
employees who will be implementing these plans, from the janitorial staff to the CEO, be trained 
and ready to enact the plans should the need immediately arise. It does no good to have plans in 
place if no one knows about them or has no idea how to implement them. A staff that is trained 
properly, armed with an ERP or COOP plan that is effectively put together, can quickly and 
efficiently react to disaster situations. 
Problem Statement 
 
In a disaster, it is expected that certain organizations will be present to set up temporary 
emergency shelters. Nonprofit homeless shelters might be considered “targets” for disaster 
victims because of their status as a shelter, and they may also be requested to assist disaster 
victims by local governments that may fund certain shelter operations during normal operations. 
These shelters are usually already at capacity with their pre-disaster homeless  residents and 
cannot easily accommodate large intakes in a short period of time. Many shelters do not have the 
supplies to accommodate a large population for even a short period of time. Since shelter 
workers are not public employees, and therefore not disaster service workers whose presence is 
required during a disaster, shelters may be unable to operate due to a lack of staff. 
 Many homeless shelters are located in older buildings that were not originally intended as 
places for human habitation. For example, Innvision Shelter Network, an organization that 
provides shelter and housing assistance in the San Francisco Bay Area, has two sites that were an 
old manufacturing building/warehouse combination and a small office building in the industrial 
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section of San Jose (Georgia Travis Center and Commercial Street Inn, respectively). Both 
buildings were converted for service provision and shelter provision by Innvision. Since shelter 
providers usually must take what buildings they can get, some use older buildings and convert 
them into shelters. As a result of this, some shelter provision services are not located in buildings 
that would be resilient to local natural disasters. Few have alternate supplies of power or 
adequate water storage to support the pre-disaster homeless population after disaster. Therefore, 
homeless shelters may experience some damage and loss of functionality that may compromise 
their use after the disaster. 
 For nonprofit homeless shelters it can be difficult to find or create as thorough a COOP 
plan as private and government entities can. Many assumptions that can be applied to those 
sectors do not hold true for nonprofits. For example, the COOP plan for Abode Services, a 
nonprofit housing and shelter provider in Alameda and Santa Clara Counties, assumes that 
“Strategies are in place to relocate personnel and processes to alternate sites as necessary” 
(Allied Business Continuity Consulting, LLC., 2010). This plan was designed by a company 
specializing in COOP plans for private companies. In general, a nonprofit homeless shelter will 
not have the resources to relocate an entire homeless shelter to another location. Nonprofits, 
especially those that are providing short and long-term shelter to homeless individuals or 
families, should have adequate COOP plans in place in order to continue to provide services to 
their communities, even in the event of a disaster that affects shelter sites.  
While there are effective plan templates available for many private sector industries and 
for government agencies, there are no plans that take into consideration the limited resources that 
a nonprofit homeless shelter has access to. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate  COOP-
creation guidance from both government and private sources and to create a template that can be 
5 
 
used successfully by nonprofit homeless shelters without causing significant strain in resource 
allocation. This template will also avoid the use of government and BCM “industry” language 
where possible, instead using simple terminology to ensure that non-experts are able to use the 
instructions in the template. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Business continuity planning (BCP) and practices do not have to follow the same rules and 
requirements that government-based plans do. Disaster planning can be time-consuming and 
expensive, and “such planning may also require organisations to commit to an investment in 
resources that may not be used and whose ‘value’ or ‘return’ cannot be ascertained with the 
levels of certainty that accompany other strategic investment decisions...” (Herbane, 2010, p. 
978). This can result in private sector organizations being reactive, rather than proactive, when it 
comes to disaster planning. Although this mindset is changing, it was a long time before 
businesses saw continuity planning as being advantageous.  
Often, businesses would go with the “path of least expense” unless government 
regulations and laws intervened. It is not surprising that it was not until US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 that companies began to keep detailed financial records and 
backups of those records. The FCPA required that publically traded companies “...make and 
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer (15 USC § 78m (b)(2)(A));” (United 
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977). It further required that systems of internal controls 
be established in order to prevent tampering with the newly required accounting records. 
Although it was created with the intention of preventing human error and malice from causing 
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financial crises to publically traded companies, the FCPA  essentially created a need for private 
organizations to have financial “disaster mitigation” plans.  
In the past, rather than have mitigation plans ready ahead of time, most private sector 
entities preferred to have plans in place that only addressed recovering from a crisis or disaster. 
The only industries that generally had disaster mitigation and recovery plans were those that 
were required to do so by law. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency released 
Banking Circular 177 in 1984, which stated that banks in the United States should “…have 
formal disaster recovery plans that included off-site provisions and testing procedures…” 
(Herbane, 2010, p. 985). This was later expanded by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, 
which mandated that banks “…protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security 
or integrity of [customer] records…” (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999). Other industries that 
were mandated to have continuity plans in place included the health insurance industry with the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in 1996 and the communications industry 
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Both of these laws required “…IT disaster recovery 
provisions to ensure the availability of systems and the security of customer records…” 
(Herbane, 2010, p. 985) 
Early Business Continuity Planning 
 
Companies recognized the problems with lost data but, rather than focusing on preventing those 
issues, they preferred to have backup systems available and copies of critical data. By this point, 
recovery experts in the private sector had already noted that natural disasters could also cause 
significant problems, but the focus at the time was on protecting data. Early recovery plans in the 
private sector were not necessarily concerned with people, properties, and other assets. Disaster 
7 
 
recovery was considered an extension of the duties of the employees in charge of data 
maintenance (Savaiano, 1984). An industry based around providing “…emergency recovery 
centres, telecommunications, data backup and restoration, salvage services, etc.” (Herbane, 2010, 
p. 982) also appeared in the 1980s, with these companies also helping to develop Disaster 
Response Plans (DRPs). Unfortunately, it was estimated that “…less than 50% of the Fortune 
1000 companies have a plan in place to insure continued availability of… valuable corporate 
resources.” (Savaiano, 1984). Herbane (2010) points out that companies’ management failed to 
see the value in DRPs unless they were compelled to create them by law, which was the case 
with banks and publicly-traded companies with regard to their financial data and the financial 
data of their customers. 
In 1988, Illinois Bell’s Hinsdale switching station caught fire. Despite having two alarms 
that went off at their headquarters, the company did not alert the local fire department. This fire 
resulted in the loss of phone service to between ten and forty thousand customers (depending on 
who is reporting). According to court documents, it took nearly a month to fully restore service 
(Bilandic, Harrison, Miller, and Harrison, 1994). Assorted lengthy lawsuits followed and “the 
phone company paid about $3.8 million in credits to customers for the cost of the service they 
didn't get, made $500,000 in grants to a dozen municipalities and government agencies as a 
gesture of good will and set up a $1 million fund to compensate businesses for their out-of-
pocket expenses in finding temporary service” (Grady, 1993). In 1994, the company was able to 
avoid paying lost-business amounts after winning an appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court, but 
the lack of any type of emergency response or disaster recovery was still costly and “…prompted 
a more outward-looking and strategic approach to crisis management planning along with a 
move beyond ‘technical’ recovery...” (Herbane, 2010, p. 982) 
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Another fire, this one in Los Angeles, occurred in 1988 and is an example of proper 
disaster planning. The 1st Interstate Bank building caught fire on May 4th and burned until May 
5th. “The fire destroyed four floors and damaged a fifth floor of the modern 62 story First 
Interstate Bank building in downtown L.A., claimed one life, injured approximately 35 
occupants and 14 fire personnel, and resulted in a property loss of over $50 million…” (TriData 
Corporation, 1998, p. 1) In contrast to the Illinois Bell fire, 1st Interstate Bank had a proper 
continuity plan in place:  
b. Within two hours of the fire being reported (at approximately 10:20PM), an 
offsite emergency operations center (EOC) was established and functioning with 
communications, vital records, plans, and access to data bases. 
   
c. On the next morning, many of the 2,000 employees were reporting to work at pre-
planned spaces in nearby buildings. One hundred telephones were immediately available 
with computers rapidly to follow. 
 
d. Within the week, all employees had returned to work, 800 telephones were in use, 
the bank’s trading center was rebuilt in an alternate building, the main branch was open, 
and the ATM machines were functioning. 
(How to stay in business when disaster strikes, 1992) 
 
Coincidentally, in the same year as these fires, one of the largest contributors to modern 
continuity research, the Disaster Recovery Institute (DRI, now the Disaster Recovery Institute 
International) “…was established… with the express mission of educating and certifying 
business continuity and disaster recovery professionals…” (Disaster Recovery Institute 
International, 2006). 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.0 (COBIT) was published 
in 1992 by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) as a guide for 
companies that needed to store and protect data. This publication focused on information 
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technology and data storage and had four phases – Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, 
Deliver and Support, and Monitor and Evaluate. Each of these four phases relies on a number of 
activities that are similar to those used in modern BCM. COBIT 4.0 also pointed out the 
importance of continuous service, stating that “The need for providing continuous IT services 
requires developing, maintaining and testing IT continuity plans, offsite backup storage and 
periodic continuity plan training. An effective continuous service process minimises the 
probability and impact of a major IT service interruption on key business functions and 
processes” (ISACA, n.d.). By this point, more guidance began to appear and organizations began 
to create “BCM standards” for use in the private sector. “Regulations tend to be mandatory and 
punitive. Guidances (sic) are produced by professional organizations that provide ’best practices’ 
for various operational and control matters. Standards… are formally approved policies, 
procedures or instructions from a recognized standards body” (Berman, n.d.).  
In the early 1990s, the focus of continuity activities shifted from the protection of data 
storage and facilities to “the need to protect and restore the critical value-generating activities of 
an organization” (Herbane, 2010, p. 984). Value-generating activities included anything that 
added value to a company’s product or service and could include, among others, employees, 
facilities, equipment, and data. In their article in Computers & Security in 1995, Smith and 
Sherwood determined that companies could no longer simply protect their data, but now needed 
to protect their business activities in such a way that they continued to provide services to their 
customers (Smith & Sherwood, 1995). DRII, at the time, was one of the first organizations to 
offer continuity certification and training that focused on this new approach. Another major 
continuity organization, the United Kingdom-based Business Continuity Institute, opened in 
1994 and was another major player in business continuity management practices. The Certified 
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Recovery Planner (CRP) also emerged in 1994 to “recognize individuals who have demonstrated 
the specific knowledge of business disaster recovery required to perform as a recovery planning 
professional” (Green III, 2002) 
In 1999, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the United Kingdom released Internal 
Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code. This report, while focused on a 
company’s internal controls, pointed out that a company’s operations were just as important as 
its financials when it came to having plans in place to manage risk. The report stated that 
effective internal controls helped a company manage risk by “enabling it to respond 
appropriately to significant business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks to 
achieving the company's objectives” (Financial Reporting Council, 2005). This meant that 
companies needed to have plans in place to respond to anything that threatened normal operating 
procedures, external threats as well as internal threats. The report contained many planning 
concepts that are used today, including the development and approval of plans by management, 
threat analyses, impact analyses, and the testing and updating of plans over time. The council 
stated that “A sound system of internal control therefore provides reasonable, but not absolute, 
assurance that a company will not be hindered in achieving its business objectives, or in the 
orderly and legitimate conduct of its business, by circumstances which may reasonably be 
foreseen” (Financial Reporting Council, 2005). It was becoming clearer that companies needed 
to be prepared for interruptions in their business operations, regardless of the source. 
Y2K & COOP  
 
Y2K’s approach in 1999 showed how unprepared many businesses and governments were 
toward the turn of the century. While the Y2K bug was identified in 1984 by Paul Gillin in an 
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article in Computerworld, it did not come up again until Peter de Jager wrote an article in 1993 
for the same publication. In general, the warning that the bug could have far-reaching 
consequences was ignored. “Many didn't think it was a real problem, and those who did felt no 
pressure to do anything about it—after all, the year 2000 was a long way away” (Manjoo, 2009). 
As early as 1996, the event was picking up national attention and its significance becoming 
clearer to Government officials. In a letter to President Bill Clinton on July 31, 1996, Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan asked “whether there is time enough to get the job done and, if not, 
what sort of triage we may need.” 
 The problem was going to be expensive and require a large, concerted effort. In 
December of 1998 the world had the first National Y2K Coordinators Meeting. At this meeting it 
was suggested that “…comprehensive crisis management plans would be necessary on a national 
level” (Kirsner, 1999). Companies and government agencies alike were scrambling to find 
solutions and fix the problem before January 1, 2000. Even when the date passed and the world 
moved on, experts noted that many companies had only implemented lackluster plans at the last 
minute. “Many organisations… didn't even have a business continuity plan before they started 
work on the date change problem. Even when the Y2K programme was complete, the business 
continuity plans were not always tested” (Vowler, 2000). Had the Y2K problem actually caused 
significant impacts, it seems likely that the businesses of the world would not have been 
prepared. 
9/11 & COOP 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 “prompted re-evaluations of organisations’ business 
continuity and disaster preparedness from the perspective of the large human losses, heightening 
12 
 
psychological impacts, and vulnerabilities arising from multi-function sites” (Herbane, 2010, p. 
987). 9/11 had a larger immediate impact on government continuity than it did on BCM, but 
“…it did set up the framework for preparedness, response and recovery improvements since for 
both the public and private sectors” (Witty, 2011). In response to 9/11 and numerous other 
events that took place afterwards, more guidance, standards, and government regulations 
regarding BCM began to emerge. The table in Appendix A-2 shows the increase in these releases 
prior to and after 9/11. For the period of time shortly after 9/11, “guidelines and regulations 
emanate strongly from the USA and are focused on the finance, public and utility sectors” 
(Herbane, 2010, p. 987). This was a reaction to the economic effects of the 9/11 disaster, as well 
as the local effects on public infrastructure such as utilities. Companies involved in those sectors 
needed to be able to maintain a minimum level of service.  
An example of published guidelines from the post-9/11 period includes the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Guidelines for Strengthening the Resilience of US Financial System, a paper 
stating “that key organizations in critical financial markets are able to recover clearing and 
settlement activities in the event of a wide-scale disruption as rapidly as possible” (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2003). The North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) also published Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector 1.0 in 2002, which 
included guidance on performing vulnerability and risk assessment, threat response, and some 
BCM concepts. It also pointed out that continuity plans needed to be in place to “reduce the 
impact of significant market or system interruptions and ensure prompt resumption of business 
and operations” (North American Electricity Reliability Council, 2002). Both of these papers left 
the actual details up to the individual organizations making up each industry. For example, when 
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identifying critical sites, NERC stated that “each company is free to define and identify those 
facilities and functions it believes to be critical, keeping in mind that the ability to mitigate the 
loss of a facility through redundancies may make that facility less critical than others” (North 
American Electricity Reliability Council, 2002). 
In 2002, DCI and DRII published ten standards of professional competence for 
individuals working in the field of emergency management. These standards “…have become 
the de facto standard for BC management professionals and have influenced the development of 
standards elsewhere internationally” (Elliot, Herbane, & Swartz, 2010, p. 56) These standards 
include: 
1) Initiation and Management 
2) Business Impact Analysis 
3) Risk Evaluation and Control 
4) Developing BCM strategies 
5) Emergency response and operations 
6) Developing and implementing business continuity and crisis management plans 
7) Awareness and training programs 
8) Maintaining and exercising business continuity and crisis management plans 
9) Crisis communications 
10) Coordination with external agencies (Elliot, Herbane, & Swartz, 2010, p. 56) 
 The above standards “…could be seen as a precursor to the development of general 
business continuity standards in a national context” (Herbane, 2010, p. 989). As more natural and 
human-caused disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina and the London bombings of 2005, occurred, 
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BCM became more and more a part of the normal operations planning for the private sector. 
Over time, the private sector standards for BCM and the government standards for Continuity of 
Operations became fairly similar. Although early private sector practices were aimed solely at 
protecting revenues, they later evolved toward helping the public during disasters. During 
Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart supplied people in affected areas with supplies much faster than 
FEMA was able to. “WalMart's [sic] successful response to Katrina, along with the failure of 
FEMA and other government agencies, seems to confirm the more general conclusion of modern 
political economy that private institutions better mobilize resources than do public agencies” 
(Horwitz, 2009). 
FEMA, Private Sector and Disasters 
 
As more disasters occurred throughout the 2000s, it became obvious that private sector entities 
should be more involved in disaster response. According to Horwitz (2009), private companies 
tend to have better logistical capabilities, are usually located in the communities where disasters 
take place, have better knowledge of those communities, are less constrained by law and 
procedure when deciding how to act, and acting for the benefits of local communities, as a form 
of public relations, can have long-term financial benefits. In contrast, large government agencies 
like FEMA are more restricted by their hierarchies and processes, some of those required by 
statute, and may lack connections to communities where a disaster has taken place that would be 
helpful in knowing what local resources are available.  
Government agencies have two primary tasks in disaster response and continuity- “support the 
ability of the Federal Government to perform National Essential Functions (NEFs), continue 
Enduring Constitutional Government, and ensure that essential services are provided to the 
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Nation’s citizens” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009) Despite the differences 
between the missions of government and private-sector, response plan formats have slowly 
become more similar as the private-sector becomes more involved in what was previously 
thought to be the responsibility of government. 
 The government uses Continuity of Operations/Government (COOP/COG), which was 
originally developed by the federal government to ensure that government functions could 
continue in the event of a nuclear attack (National Public Radio, 2011). Continuity of 
government has different goals from business continuity. Both require the continuous 
functioning of certain functions in order to ensure that customers, or the public at large, are still 
receiving essential services. In COG, it is additionally important for government functions to 
continue unimpeded. This is a requirement for all government agencies at the Federal level. In 
2007, President George W. Bush issued the National Security Presidential Directive 
51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) in order to “…establish 
and maintain a comprehensive and effective national continuity capability to ensure the 
resilience and the preservation of our form of Government… and the continuing performance of 
National Essential Functions under all conditions” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2014c). This is accomplished by ensuring that a set of eight functions, called the National 
Essential Functions (NEFs), can be continuously performed. The NEFs are located in Appendix 
A-1. Supporting the NEFs are Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs). Each government 
organization has a set of PMEFs that needs to be continuously performed during a crisis or 
restored within twelve hours. PMEFs are identified at the Federal level and are supported by an 
agency’s Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), which “are those functions that enable an 
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organization to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the public, 
and sustain the industrial/economic base” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).  
 Initially, COG was aimed mostly at the federal level of government. Although FEMA 
and DHS released publications providing guidance to state, local, and tribal governments there 
was no real requirement for them to take part in the federal COG requirements. Hurricane 
Katrina’s botched response was a result of this. Responders from all three levels of government 
conflicted with one another, there was poor communication between agencies, and there was no 
clear chain of command for many response activities, resulting in redundancies and conflicting 
orders. (Block & Cooper, 2006). HSPD-20 addressed this by declaring that plans would now “be 
appropriately integrated with the emergency plans and capabilities of State, local, territorial, and 
tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as 
appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and to prevent redundancies and conflicting 
lines of authority” (Bush, 2007).  
PPD-8 and Whole Community  
 
In 2011, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8, which replaces HSPD-8 
and expands on the idea that disaster response is not just a government activity. In PPD-8, 
President Obama stated that “Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels 
of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens” (Obama, 2011). This 
suggests that, in the event of a disaster, the entire community should respond instead of hoping 
that government agencies will be able to mount an appropriate response. The community should 
not assume that the government will not be overwhelmed. When this happens, as it did in 
Katrina, it can be days before an outside entity can respond. The Whole Community (WC) 
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concept also includes planning. There is no reason why local stakeholders - whether public, 
private, nonprofit, or individuals - should not be aware of the resource needs of the community, 
of the local disaster risks and threats, and how they can assist in mitigation, preparation, and 
response. As was stated by James Lee Witt, the director of FEMA from 1993 to 2001, “all 
disasters are local” (Edwards, 2007). When local resources are available to assist, regardless of 
source, disaster response should not be held solely as the responsibility of government. The WC 




In order to find a solution to the stated problem, a notional managerial audit was conducted, 
beginning with a survey of organizations providing homeless shelters in Santa Clara and 
Alameda Counties in California. This survey revealed a low level of COOP planning in these 
organizations, sometimes agency-wide and across services. This stems from of a lack of 
guidance relevant to their work, appropriate to their resources, and accessible to those without 
formal BCM or COOP/COG training. The problem was identified as a lack of a usable template, 
with accompanying instructions, for the development of a COOP for a homeless shelter run by a 
non-profit agency with limited resources available for planning. The solution to the problem, 
which is embodied in this research, is the development of a guidance package for COOP 
planning that is designed for use by non-profit homeless shelters and includes a simple template 







1) Most homeless shelters operated by non-profit organizations in Santa Clara and Alameda 
Counties have limited COOP plans to support post-disaster service provision to the pre-
disaster homeless. 
A survey of community service providers in the Santa Clara County and Alameda County 
areas revealed a lack of adequate COOP planning in most organizations. A summary of the 
findings is in Table I.  
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Org Do you have a 
COOP plan? 
If not, why? Is your plan complete? If not, why? 
Is your plan up-to-date? If not, 
why? 
Is your staff trained on the 
COOP? If not, why? 
A Yes No – plan was designed by third-party 
who only provided an IT plan. No one 
on staff knows how to revise it 
No – plan does not have non-IT 
services, no staff on hand to 
revise plan 
Staff are trained on placeholder 
plan, which is only a 7-day 
extension of their ERPs  
B No – “Plan 
not required.” 
Management does not believe that a response plan is necessary – there are no immediate requirements for a 
continuity plan from any funding source – if there was such a requirement they would probably outsource 
C Yes Yes No – plan has not been updated in 
several years, no available staff 
on hand has time to be 
trained/revise 
Yes – staff is trained on existing, 
out-of-date plan. Some activities 
not covered under old plan 
D Yes No – Unable to allocate staff time to 
activity 
No – Unable to allocate 
time/money to activity 
No – Unable to allocate 
time/money to activity 
E Yes No – plan has not been revised to add 
new activities in several years, 
employee who designed plan left 
company 
No – Employee who designed 
plan left company, plan is not a 
priority for management 
No – employee who organized 
trainings left company, plan 
training not a priority for 
management 
F Yes Yes No – plan has not been updated in 
several years, is not a priority for 
management 
Yes – staff are trained on out-of-
date plan 
G Yes No – no one on staff knew how to 
properly design plan; some pieces are 
complete, others are not; no one on 
staff understands how to create plan 
No – All parts of plan are several 
years out of date, no one on staff 
knows how to update existing 
pieces 
No – a trainer is present, but 
management does not believe 
there is time/money for training 
H No – not a 
management 
priority 
Management understands the need for a plan, but believes that other activities related to service provision are 
higher priorities and does not want to contract out for a plan, hire new staff, or train a staff person to work on 
one. 
I Yes Yes, but site supervisor noted that 
senior management is uninvolved 
Yes – site supervision team 
updates plan on own initiative 
Yes- Site supervision team trains 
staff on own initiative 
J Yes No – needs to add new service, no 
staff time available 
No – not a management priority, 
no staff/money for dedicated staff 
Yes, except where plan is out of 
date 
Table 1: Responses From Participating Homeless Shelters in Santa Clara and Alameda Counties 
Omitted from the survey results are seven organizations that declined to participate, four 
organizations who did not know what a continuity plan was, and four organizations who did not 
respond to contact attempts. Initially, the majority of the service providers surveyed were 
unwilling to answer any questions regarding their disaster preparations. On a later attempt, with a 
promise of anonymity, service providers were willing to provide answers to some of the 
questions. It is possible that, given the results from those who participated following a promise 
of anonymity, these organizations did not wish to have their results publicized due to unmet 
contractual requirements or other public scrutiny. If service grants (public or private), especially 
for vital services like shelter and food distribution, require that the organization remain 
functional regardless of emergencies, having their lack of preparedness on record could very 
negatively impact them. 
 Of those organizations who responded there was a common issue – many of the 
organizations lacked access to a staff member or team who understood how to set up a continuity 
plan, update it, and train others on it. Those with plans in place have the same issue, but their 
concerns are updating out-of-date plans. The cause of this problem ranged from the organization 
lacking time and money to train and assign staff, no money to hire someone or contract the task 
out, and a lack of involvement by management. FEMA and BCM guidance tends to be complex. 
A guide aimed at those who have no related training could be very helpful in helping these 
organizations to create plans. 
2) Pre-disaster Homeless Continue to Need Specialized Services After a Disaster 
 Homelessness is defined differently depending on the government agency doing the 
defining. For the purposes of this study, the definition from the Department of Housing and 
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Urban Development (HUD) will be used. Summarized, a person who is homeless is defined by 
HUD as: 
1. A person or family living in a place not meant for human habitation, in an emergency 
shelter, people living in transitional housing, or people exiting an institution where they 
temporarily resided such as prison 
2. People losing their primary residence within fourteen days 
3. Families with children, or unaccompanied youths, who are unstably housed 
4. Anyone fleeing a domestic violence situation (National Alliance to End Homelessness, 
2012) 
These are not populations that should be left to fend for themselves after a major disaster. In 
addition, the homeless are recognized by the US Department of Health and Human Services as 
possibly having “…higher risk of adverse physical and psychological reactions following a 
public health emergency or disaster” (Department of Health and Human Services, 2013). Their 
issues could be significantly exacerbated by a lack of post-disaster resources. Homeless 
households are also included in jurisdiction listings of their most vulnerable populations 
alongside groups such as youths and the elderly.  Each of these jurisdictions has acknowledged 
that the homeless are a special-needs group that requires special assistance. Homeless shelters 
provide an essential community service in normal times, meeting the sheltering and services 
needs of homeless families and individuals. Often this population has no other resources for food 
and shelter in normal times.  Many have no source of financial support and may experience long 
term unemployment. In addition, many long-term homeless individuals have multiple barriers to 
obtaining housing, including mental health and substance abuse issues.  
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The San Francisco bay area is susceptible to numerous types of disasters, including 
earthquakes, fires, and flooding. All of these are capable of negatively impacting the homeless 
population in a variety of ways. A point-in-time (PIT) count for Santa Clara County in 2013 
shows that 7,361 individuals were homeless at that time, with 74% of that number being 
“unsheltered, living on the street, in parks, encampments, vehicles, or other places not meant for 
human habitation” (Applied Survey Research, 2013c, p. 9). The remainder reside in shelters, 
which can include transitional shelters, emergency overnight shelters, and domestic violence 
shelters. The City of San Jose, which is within Santa Clara County, had 4,770 homeless when 
their 2013 PIT count was completed. This was an 18% increase from 2011. 76% of those 
individuals were unsheltered (Applied Survey Research, 2013a, p. 9). To the north, the 2013 PIT 
count for San Francisco had a total 6,436, with 59% of that number being unsheltered (Applied 
Survey Research, 2013b, pp. 3-4) It is important to keep in mind that the PIT counts are, for the 
most part, a head count. Homeless individuals or families who are not visible or are avoiding 
contact are excluded. 
In a non-disaster situation, most of the shelters available in the above jurisdictions will be 
full every night. 62% of homeless individuals interviewed in the San Jose 2013 PIT count stated 
that there were no available shelter beds on nights that they went unsheltered (Applied Survey 
Research, 2013a, p. 13). In the event that a homeless shelter itself is damaged and cannot provide 
services to its normal users, those individuals would need to seek out other locations for services. 
This would cause more people to go unsheltered since the individuals or families from the 
damaged shelter would either have to take spots at other shelters or go unsheltered themselves. 
For most people, the Red Cross provides adequate post-disaster shelter to people who 
have found themselves homeless after a disaster. This is not true for the pre-disaster homeless. 
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The Red Cross, under normal circumstances, will not provide any assistance to pre-disaster 
homeless. The organization views this as pre-disaster homeless taking advantage of services 
meant only for disaster victims and will turn away anyone without the ability to prove that they 
have a permanent address (Futrell & Small, 2011). In 1994, Red Cross representatives stated that 
assisting the homeless is not part of their mission and that “We can only return people to their 
pre-disaster status “ (Hill-Holtzman, 1994). After closing their own shelters, anyone who was not 
homeless pre-disaster will likely be directed to non-disaster homeless shelters. This means that, 
if non-disaster shelters are taken out of operations for an extended period time, the amount of 
homeless individuals going unsheltered will increase and may include pre-disaster housed 
individuals who cannot prove their residency or who cannot be housed before Red Cross or other 
local responders close their services down. 
3) Despite their status as a special-needs group in many jurisdictions, pre-disaster homeless will 
generally not be eligible for disaster assistance programs, including sheltering and re-
housing.  
There are a number of different types of relief available for post-disaster homeless 
individuals. For example, FEMA has their Individuals and Households Program (IHP) that 
“provides financial help or direct services to those who have necessary expenses and serious 
needs if they are unable to meet the needs through other means” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2014a). The IHP provides services such as temporary housing, repairs to 
homes damaged in a disaster not covered by insurance, medical and dental expenses, moving and 
storage expenses, and the replacement of clothing or some other items damaged in a disaster. In 
order to qualify for the IHP individuals must be able to provide proof of residency and 
citizenship, as well as “proof of occupancy, ownership, income loss, and/or information 
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concerning their housing situation prior to the disaster” (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2014a). According to Rosa Elaine Garcia, a supervisor at Abode Services in Fremont, 
CA, most homeless individuals or families do not carry much in the way of identification, 
certainly not Social Security information or a birth certificate. They may have a state-issued 
identification card, but they usually prefer to remain as off-the-grid as possible. In addition, a 
homeless person will not be able to prove occupancy or ownership of a residence since they, by 
definition, have neither of these (R. E. Garcia, personal communication February 4, 2015).  
Homeless individuals will also fail to qualify for assistance under the category FEMA calls 
“Other Than Housing Needs,” which includes the above medical and dental needs. FEMA 
requires that households prove that they “have filed for insurance benefits and the damage to 
[their] property is not covered by [their] insurance or [their] insurance settlement is insufficient 
to meet your losses” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014b) which disqualifies them 
for this type of assistance.  
Non-FEMA assistance will largely depend on the jurisdiction in which the person is 
attempting to access services and whether the local government or a local non-profit has factored 
the homeless into their emergency response and COOP planning. As mentioned previously, the 
American Red Cross will not provide shelter or other assistance to pre-disaster homeless. Some 
jurisdictions, recognizing this, have set up their own plans to provide disaster relief services to 
pre-disaster homeless.   The Los Angeles County Mass Care Homelessness Strategy provides 
guidance to the Red Cross in the event that a pre-disaster homeless individual requires services. 
When a pre-disaster homeless individual or family attempts to access services through Red 
Cross, the organization is required to contact the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority 
(LAHSA). LAHSA then evaluates the person’s situation to determine which existing homeless 
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services through their agency the person or family in question qualifies for. In the event that 
LAHSA is unable to respond, the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) is to be notified 
so that alternate resources can be located.  Note that it cannot be assumed that alternate resources 
are being set aside specifically for pre-disaster homeless by local jurisdictions. For example, the 
San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan only mentions service provision 
to post-disaster homeless, and the estimates of shelter usage for local Counties after a major 
disaster do not include pre-disaster homeless.  
4) The need for continuity plans is not understood by organizations’ leadership. 
Leadership may be reluctant to spend time and money on a continuity plan, especially when 
resources and staffing are scarce. They may also not fully be aware of the risks to the 
organization in the event that a disaster occurs and there is no plan in place. In the case of a 
nonprofit shelter, having a plan could protect clients, visitors, and staff from injury or death; 
protect the building itself and other assets (such as food, beds, water) that are kept inside; reduce 
or eliminate any interruption of services for the agency, especially in the event that the shelter 
functions as a coordinated point-of-entry; and assist in the timely restoration to full operations, 
whether at the original site or at a new operations site.  
A continuity plan, or at least some sort of recovery plan, may also be required by law or 
by contracts with partner agencies or funders and can protect against lawsuits that may occur if 
injuries are sustained (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 2006). Management should also 
be made aware of the costs of not using a continuity plan, which can include monetary loss, 
significant disruptions to critical functions and impacts to the community, and even the loss of 





Need for COOP Plans at Shelters 
 
A review of available resources and literature has revealed very little COOP guidance providing 
assistance to nonprofits, whose financial and resource limitations do not permit the use of a 
standard BCM guidance. Homeless shelters and other service providers, especially those in areas 
with a high risk of a disaster, should have a COOP plan. Homeless shelters provide a valuable 
service to the communities that they are a part of and to those who need their services.  
In a disaster, homeless shelters may need to provide assistance to the community at large, 
as well as their usual clients. Although the Red Cross often sets up emergency shelters after a 
disaster, it is always possible that disaster victims will go to a homeless shelter first, especially if 
it is local to them and they are familiar with it. Local government may also route citizens who 
have been displaced or who are in need of other services to a local homeless shelter if other 
sources are unavailable (F. Edwards, personal communication August 15, 2013).   
Homeless shelter providers should also be aware that, after a disaster, some victims will 
seek out aid for reasons other than being displaced. After the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, 
many area residents who were not rendered homeless or injured headed to local and Red Cross 
shelters due to “…emotional upset, fear of aftershocks and further damage, and concern about 
the safety of their children” (Tierney, 1994, p. 111). 
 Furthermore, pre-disaster homeless do not have a fixed address within the disaster area 
and, as a result, they are not able to access most community disaster services. Many of these 
services are only available to those with official documentation of a fixed residence in the 
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disaster area (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014d). Because of this, homeless 
shelters that pre-disaster homeless are used to receiving services from may be the only source of 
post-disaster housing and assistance for them. 
In the event that a disaster occurs in which an unprepared homeless shelter is damaged to 
the extent that it would be unable to provide services, numerous stakeholders would be affected. 
These might include the local community, the local pre-disaster homeless population, local law 
enforcement, and others. In addition, if the shelter is funded by local government, they may have 
a requirement that, as a condition of receiving funding for shelter operations, the organization 
operating the shelter maintain a COOP plan and be prepared to assist the community in the event 
of a disaster. This expectation will remain even in the event that the shelter itself is damaged. 
The operating organization should be prepared with plans to provide services in whatever way 
that it can until its normal homeless services operations have been fully restored. 
COOP PLAN CREATION 
 
The requirements of continuity planning were ascertained through a literature search and the 
available models were adapted to the needs of homeless shelters in the nonprofit sector. This 
adaptation included considering financial limitations, staffing concerns, and government and 
community expectations. Guidance for the creation of a plan was created to be used alongside a 
blank plan template. This guidance assumes that the planner has no experience with BCM and is 
designed to make plan creation instructions as simple and straightforward as possible without 
losing the intent of the plans.  
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 In order to create this template, the planning guidance from existing publications from   
respected writers and researchers in the fields of business and government continuity 
management were adapted to fit the needs of the nonprofit sector. Sources  included government 
publications such as the Continuity Guidance Circulars 1 & 2, the Federal Continuity Directives 
1 & 2, and other FEMA publications and independent study courses on COOP. Information from 
the private sector was drawn from publications and courses from DRII and other organizations 
with a history of successful BCM implementation.  
CONCLUSION 
 
As previously stated, continuity guidance from both business and government sectors assumes 
that resources are in place to a degree that nonprofits cannot match without assistance. The 
template that was developed used the best practices from both the government and private 
sectors and adapted them for use for nonprofit homeless shelters. This template takes into 
consideration the limitations of nonprofit organizations and developed effective patches for the 
holes that these limitations can create in their continuity plans. The result of this study and plan 
development will enable nonprofit organizations to be better equipped to respond to emergency 
situations and sustain their essential operations for their own viability and the good of the 






































This guide was created to simplify the COOP plan creation process for nonprofit agencies and, 
where possible, identify staffing and monetary alternatives. This guide is aimed primarily toward 
shelter operations, and the samples and examples almost exclusively use shelter operations. The 
guidance here should, however, be adaptable to any type of nonprofit environment. 
 An unfortunate reality of the continuity process is that it is extremely time-consuming 
and expensive. This guide aims to create a single document that combines the critical tasks 
required to create a COOP plan, as opposed to existing guidance which is either spread across 
multiple documents, prohibitively expensive to a nonprofit, or that only touches on the very 
basics of each task. This COOP plan guide will help facilitate the creation of plans covering the 
following in the event of a disaster that interferes with company functions for a long period of 
time:  
1) Prevention and Mitigation 
a. Identifying Critical/Mission Essential Functions (MEFs,) or those functions that 
cannot be interrupted for long periods of time; (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2009, p. A-1) 
b. Identifying threats to an organization’s processes to avoid interruptions by 
preventing events or minimizing their impacts (Edwards & Goodrich, 2011, p. 17) 






2) Planning  
a. Creating plans to respond to events that cannot be prevented in order to minimize 
their impacts on functions (Edwards & Goodrich, 2011, p. 20) 
b. Training staff on emergency procedures, testing those procedures periodically, 
and running exercises to maintain staff preparedness (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2009, p. K1) 
3) Response and Reconstitution 
a. Recovery and resumption of critical operations and systems after an emergency 
has ended (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012, p. M1) 
4) Recovery 
a. Restoration or replacement of critical infrastructure and monetary assets lost 
during an event 
PLANNING FOR DISASTER 
Identifying the Purpose and Scope of the Plan 
 
The planner first must define the purpose of the plan for leadership and define the scope of the 
plan. In general, the purpose of the plan will be to ensure that essential functions can be carried 
out in the event that something occurs that can disrupt their normal operations. The scope of the 
operation will depend on the approach the planner decides to take in building the plans. The 
scope of the plan may be a single site, like a shelter. This is more likely if the organization has 
many scattered sites. In general, though, all of the organization’s different departments and sites 
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will be covered in a single COOP document, making the scope of the plan the entire 
organization.  
Getting Leadership Involved 
 
Before a planner begins the process of setting up his continuity plan, he should start by preparing 
to “sell” the idea of continuity planning to the agency’s leadership. In the nonprofit sector, 
depending on the organization, this could include not only C-level leadership and senior 
management, but the organization’s board of directors as well. As mentioned on page 29, the 
need for a continuity plan goes beyond just being able to maintain operations. There may be 
contractual requirements to create and maintain a plan. Failing to do so can lead to the loss of 
grant funds. Leadership should also be aware that failing to have, at the very least, a basic 
continuity plan can negatively impact staff, community, and clients as services go unprovided. 
“Selling” the continuity plan to these decision makers should establish a need for a continuity 
plan. Organization leadership should understand that it is extremely important that they 
understand the purpose of the plan, the costs of plan, and the benefits of the plan. They should 
also understand the impacts to the organization and the community in the event that a continuity 
plan is not used, should that be their final decision.  
Setting Timelines, Budgets, and Teams 
 
Once the project has been approved, it will need a timeline, a budget, and staffing. Since every 
agency will have different functions, threats, and resources it is not possible to offer accurate 
guidance on setting a timeline. The planner should try to set a realistic goal that is not so short 
that work is hurried and becomes inaccurate, but also not so long that management decides that 
resources are best spent on more immediate needs. The main items that will determine the 
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timeline will likely be available staffing, number of sites, number of potential threats, and the 
number of functions that need to be examined in Phase 1. 
For a nonprofit with an inflexible budget, it is likely that senior management or the board 
of directors will assign a certain amount of dollars and request that the planner remain within that 
assigned budget. In the event that the project will exceed the allotted funds, it never hurts to ask 
for more from management. It may also be possible to look for Town/City or County grants that 
specifically address continuity operations. In the event that agency activities are government-
funded, especially high-profile sites like shelters or food banks, it may also be possible to use the 
same “sales” technique used for management with the funder. It is as much in their interest to 
have an operating shelter in a disaster as it is in the requesting agency’s. 
At a nonprofit agency staffing is already limited. Although staff may be willing to assist 
in creating a COOP plan, they may simply lack the time necessary. Depending on the agency’s 
size and the number of sites that need to be worked on, it is possible, though time-consuming, for 
one planner to handle COOP plans for an agency. This will take a long time. Another option is to 
set up a group of employees, one from each site who is preferably in management for that site, 
and form a steering committee. The committee can meet however often is deemed necessary and 
can create teams to help develop the plan at each site, determine how much time is available to 
work on COOP-related tasks, and can help develop and review plans for improvements. 
Committee members would present their teams’ work to the planner, who would in turn present 
it to agency leadership. As needed, it may be possible to fill staffing “holes” in each site’s team 
with long-term volunteers who have good knowledge of the staff and functions of a site. It may 
also be possible to recruit volunteers specifically for the purpose of working on the continuity 
plan. It is also possible for a single person to work on multiple teams where necessary. Appendix 
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B-1 has a simple form that can be used to keep track of committee members, their sites, and their 
teams in the event that someone needs the information. 
For simplicity, throughout this document the term “planner” will be used to refer to 
anyone who is working on the COOP plan and can include the planner, the steering committee 
members, or any teams assigned to perform the assorted tasks involved in creating the COOP 
plan. 
MITIGATION AND PREVENTION 
Identifying Mission-Essential Functions  
 
Once the planner is ready, he should begin researching what the critical functions, infrastructure, 
and records are for each site that the agency operates. Every site, even administrative sites that 
only handle back-end functions, should participate in this process. Critical functions are activities 
that will significantly impact operation of the organization if they are interrupted for more than a 
few days (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 2006, p. 1.26). Critical infrastructure is 
defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “… the assets, systems, and networks, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital… that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect…” (Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  For a shelter, this might 
include utilities, the IT system for client info, food donation intake, or the building itself. Finally, 
critical records include things like client files, Policy and Procedure manuals, or system backups. 
The full list of functions that drive the operations at each site are called the Basic Operating 




MEFs are “those essential functions directly related to accomplishing the mission of the 
organization” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. A1). These functions cannot 
be deferred for long during a disaster. Depending on organizational, community, and legal needs 
some functions may need to be restored to activity in a very short period of time. Others can be 
deferred longer, but not indefinitely. Non-essential tasks that can be deferred during a disaster 
are called Non-Essential Functions (NEFs). It is important to ensure that the organization does 
not label too many functions as essential. If too many functions are considered as essential 
during planning, it is possible that not enough resources will be available to perform them and 
other, more important functions during an emergency (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013c, p. B1). Also important are each MEF’s essential supporting activities (ESAs). As defined 
in FCD-2, “ESAs are facilitating activities that enable the organization to perform MEFs; they 
are important and urgent, but accomplishing the ESA does not complete the mission or deliver 
the services the [agency] was created to accomplish” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013c, p. A1). If a MEF cannot be completed without its associated ESAs, then the ESAs will 
need to be recovered first. FCD-2 provides the following guidance on differentiating a MEF 
from an ESA – 
If the function results in the delivery of service to the public or another agency, it 
probably performs a function that is essential to the mission of the agency. If the function 
results in a service being delivered to another part of the same agency, it likely is a 
supporting activity. Supporting activities are typically enablers that make it possible for 
an agency to accomplish its Mission. 
 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. B3) 
 Identifying BOFs and determining which of those are MEFs and ESAs is a very involved 
process that will take a lot of time. Unless the agency creating the plan can dedicate a single 
person to working on the task, it is best to take a team approach and assign several individuals 
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the task of identifying, researching, and then expanding on each BOF. In the event that an 
agency has multiple sites, a team or individual should create a list of BOFs for each site. This 
remains true even if each site performs similar activities or provides similar services. The 
following table gives an example of the differences between the MEFs, ESAs, and NEFs. 
Essential- vs. Non-Essential 
Functions Essential Non-Essential 
Mission 
Mission-Essential Function 
Subsidy payments to landlords 
Regardless of circumstance, landlords will 




During a disaster, staff time and resources 
could be better used focusing on recovery 
activities 
 
Planning Client Social Activities 
While nice for clients to have, this activity is 
not essential during a disaster, nor is it usually 
part of a shelter organization’s mission 
Non-Mission 
Essential Supporting Activity  
Accepting Food Donations or Deliveries 
During a disaster, if food deliveries are not 
being properly handled they could be stolen, 
lost, spoil, etc. 
Table 2: Organization Functions 
Once all of the BOFs have been separated into MEFs and their supporting ESAs, the list should 
be further broken down into essential and non-essential functions. If a function does not need to 
be performed without interruption and can afford to be deferred during a disaster, it is a NEF. 
For example, during a disaster a shelter should not worry about performing audits or having staff 
attend meetings. These would not assist with the performance of MEFs in any way and can be 
safely excluded from the list of functions. All functions identified as MEF and ESA candidates 
should be examined to determine whether they can be deferred during a disaster.  
The MEFs at each site will then be prioritized. Depending on circumstances and the size 
of the organization, it may be possible that MEFs from multiple sites can be affected at the same 
time. For this reason, MEFs should be prioritized not only within each site, but also from site to 
site. For example, an earthquake may damage both a shelter and a food distribution center at the 
same time. The agency will need to decide which of their MEFs is higher in priority as part of 
the planning process. It should never be assumed that a disaster will only affect one site. 
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At the end of this process, the completed package should be submitted to agency 
leadership. It will be up to them to review the list of MEFs and determine whether the 
prioritization suggested by the team or individual is appropriate and, where necessary, make 
changes or suggestions.  
In order to help identify MEF and ESA candidates, the reasons why each function is 
being performed should be identified. Some examples of questions to ask when determining 
whether an activity needs to be performed during, or shortly after, a disaster may include–  
a. Are there laws in place that require the activity to be performed, or quickly 
restored, in the event of a disaster? 
b. Are there contract requirements, usually from a funding source, that require 
that the activity be performed, or quickly restored, in the event of a disaster? 
c. Is this activity related to the primary mission of the agency? For example, an 
organization dedicated to providing emergency overnight shelter to single 
mothers should be able to provide that service regardless of any disasters that 
occur; 
d. Does agency leadership require that certain tasks be performed regardless of 
disruptions to agency functions? 
e. Will there be significant impact to external stakeholders? 
 When identifying MEFs and their ESAs, the agency should “describe each function in 
basic terms and should identify products or services delivered or actions each function 
accomplishes” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. B3). This will help avoid 
wasting time describing activities that may be NEFs. In this early phase, a single sentence should 
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be sufficient. When selecting MEFs and ESAs, it is important not to confuse the two. ESAs only 
enable the MEFs to be accomplished; they do not provide any services or products on their own. 
Table 2 shows an example of the differences between MEFs and ESAs. Appendix B-2 contains a 
blank form for use when identifying MEFs and ESAs. 
Mission vs. Supporting Functions 
Mission Function Supporting Functions 
Provision of food to shelter visitors Accepting food deliveries/donations; 
Preparation of food; Cleaning of kitchen and 
dishes 
Subsidy payments to landlords Creation of payments lists; writing of subsidy 
checks 
Educating community on homelessness Creation of “lesson plans;” organization of 
community members 
Client referral to required services Performing client assessments; providing 
information packets;  
Table 3: Mission vs. Supporting Functions 
Creation of Data Sheets 
 
Once the organization’s MEFs and associated ESAs have been identified, the planner should 
perform “…a detailed review of each MEF to more fully describe each function that enables [an 
agency] to accomplish its mission and then document the review” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2013c, p. B5). Each MEF should have its own data sheet, as these will be 
reviewed later for prioritization. During these reviews it may also be possible to identify ESAs 
that may have been missed during the initial examination of performed functions. Data sheets for 
each function should be created by people who are familiar with the MEFs. A shelter manager or 
monitor will probably know more about shelter operations than the shelter’s check-in/checkout 
volunteer. In the event that this is not possible due to time constraints, questionnaires can be 




 A completed data sheet should have all of the following information – 
1) The name of the site or department the MEF is performed by. For example, subsidy 
payments might be paid by the Finance department, while emergency overnight 
shelter services are provided by the entire shelter site. 
2) The name of the MEF, along with a short statement describing what the MEF does. 
For example, “Food distribution services provide food to our clients.” 
3) A narrative describing the following: 
a. Why this function has been identified as a MEF; 
b. What service or services this function provides. Names of ESAs should be 
included to help determine how much effort will be needed to restore the 
function; 
c. Impacts to the organization, community, or other stakeholders if the function 
is not performed; 
d. The function’s Recovery Time Objective (RTO); 
i. DRII defines the RTO as “…a deadline for pre-defined systems, 
applications, processes, functions, or operations to be restored and 
available… to prevent severe or fatal impact to the organization, its 
business or missions” (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 2006, 
p. 3.15). In short, the RTO is the maximum amount of time, from the 
point that it is interrupted, that a function may be out of commission. It 
should be noted if a function requires continuous performance 
regardless of a disruption – these functions will have an RTO of zero 
or close to zero. 
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e. Any partners, external or internal, that provide a product or service that is 
needed to perform the MEF. For example, some shelter providers receive food 
from a local food bank in addition to donations. Donations may or may not 
come in during the aftermath of a disaster, so the organization may wish to 
request emergency food deliveries from the food bank. Internal groups should 
also be included. If a second shelter exists, it may be able to share resources 
with that affected site; 
f. The contact information for the person who would be capable of answering 
any follow-up questions about the above. 
A blank MEF data sheet can be found in Appendix B-4. 
Prioritization of MEFs 
 
Once a data sheet has been completed for each identified MEF, they need to be compared and 
prioritized. This will establish which MEFs need to be put first in the “queue” in the event that 
resources are stretched thin and the organization has to choose which functions to focus on first. 
Prioritizing MEFs can be done as the agency sees fit. Some examples of ways to prioritize MEFs 
may include: 
1) RTO 
a. MEF recovery priorities could be based on the acceptable downtime for the 
function. For example, continuous functions with a zero RTO would need to be 





a. Priorities could be set based on the impact they will have on the organization, 
clients, or community if they are not performed for a long period of time. An 
inability to provide food provision services for a long period of time can lead to 
clients getting sick due to stress and malnourishment, more panhandling or crimes 
like shoplifting, or an increase in the number of people waiting around the site for 
food, making it difficult for responders to perform their tasks. MEFs that would 
have a larger negative impact could be prioritized over others. 
3) Management preferences 
a. Agency leadership may want some functions restored before others. 
4) Legal or contract requirements 
a. Funders may require that certain tasks be restored faster than others. 
Priorities may be a combination of factors and there is no single, correct way to set them. 
Planners should use their best judgment and remember that the point of identifying the MEFs is 
to minimize the impacts caused by any sort of disruption. If there are a large number of MEFs 
and ESAs to be prioritized, FEMA suggests that “It may be most efficient to group the MEFs 
into priority categories rather than attempting to establish a comprehensive linear list” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. B8). For example, in Generic Continuity of 
Operations/Continuity of Government Plan for State-Level Transportation Agencies, Dr. Frances 
Edwards, Daniel Goodrich, and William Medigovich break their priorities into three priority 
categories: A – to be restored within twelve hours; B – to be restored within seventy-two hours; 
and C – to be restored within thirty days of the interruption (Edwards, Goodrich, & Medigovich, 
2011, pp. 6.11-6.12). If the list of MEFs is relatively short, it is acceptable to make an ordered 
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list with the RTO of each function next to it, so long as MEFs with the same priority are 
indicated somehow so that it can be determined which of those are the priority. A worksheet to 
help assign priorities is located on Appendix B-5. 
Business Process Analysis 
   
The Business Process Analysis (BPA) documents each component that needs to be in place in 
order for the MEF to be performed. The BPA will identify the exact steps and inputs required to 
perform the MEF for later planning stages. FEMA recommends that organizations “…perform a 
BPA to ensure that the right people, equipment, capabilities, records, and supplies are identified 
and available where needed during a disruption so that MEFs can be resumed quickly and 
performed as required” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. C1). If processes 
are already mapped in detail elsewhere, it may be possible to use those process details to assist 
with this step. Since this process is concerned with actual MEF processes and not MEF outputs, 
it can be helpful in locating any ESAs that have been missed up to this point. BPAs have nine 
steps, detailed below. A blank BPA worksheet can be found on Appendix B-6. 
Detailing MEF Output 
 
At this stage, the details of what the MEF produces or provides in non-emergency circumstances 
will be determined. In FCD-2, FEMA recommends that specific metrics be identified. In 
addition, any time-sensitive tasks that must be done before the MEF can be initiated  should be 
noted. Outputs should be described as briefly as possible (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2013c, p. B6). Some sample outputs might include – 
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1) Provide use of an average of ninety (out of one hundred) shelter beds to individuals 
who need them from 8pm to 8am.  
2) Provide breakfast, lunch, and dinner meals to individuals at the following intervals: 
8AM – 9AM, 12PM – 1PM, 6PM – 7PM. 
3) Provide case management/crisis management services between 9am and 5pm on 
weekdays. 
Identify Operational Requirements 
 
The next step is to examine the output of each MEF and determine the required inputs to support 
it.  FEMA states that inputs are “required to accomplish the MEF outputs, which includes the 
information, guidance, and coordination from both internal (within the agency) and external 
(outside of the agency) partners” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. C3). 
Inputs should be listed in the order that they are performed. If an input is provided by a third 
party, internal or external, it should be indicated. Each input should also provide the amount of 
time normally allotted to complete the task involved. Below is a simplified sample outline of 
MEF inputs –  
1. MEF – Provide shelter beds to individuals between 8pm and 8am 
a. Collect pillows, blankets, and sheets for cleaning – 9am – 10am 
b. Clean collected bedding (wash, dry, replace damaged) - 10am – 1pm 
i. Items needing replacement can be obtained in the supply closet 
1. Replacement supplies are obtained through donations or 
ordered through the Admin department 
c. Prepare beds with cleaned/replaced bedding – 1pm – 3pm 
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d. Prepare cones/dividers for intake line for individuals - 3pm – 4pm 
e. Prepare shelter bed intake forms for individuals - 3pm – 4pm 
f. Assign staff and volunteers for shelter intake - 3pm – 4pm 
g. Shelter bed assignments, intake completion - 4pm – 7pm 
h. Prepare shelter for nighttime activities - 7pm – 8pm 
i. Nighttime activities, i.e.: monitoring site, ensuring security - 8pm – 8am 
Note that the above list is a very simplified sample and does not reflect the daily inputs of 
every shelter.  
In the above example, the amount of time that each task requires is provided. In the 
instance that other parties must be relied upon for a replacement item, each source of that item 
has been provided. In this example, replacement supplies may not be immediately available. In 
this case, the source for new supplies would either be from donations, an external party, or from 
an internal order of supplies. 
Identify Leadership Requirements 
 
If a MEF requires input from agency leadership it must be noted in this step. This does not 
include the supervision of tasks by a supervisor – this step is to identify tasks that must be 
performed by, or require direct input from, a high-level manager at the organization. For 
example, some shelters require that the day’s food supplies be inspected by senior management 
before they are used. If an agency pays rental subsidies, requiring a signature from a member of 
senior management on the checks would count as a necessary input. It should be noted whether it 
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is possible for this task to be performed remotely in the event that senior management is unable 
to reach the site. If no senior management input is required, skip this step. 
Identify Personnel Requirements 
 
This step will identify the skills needed to perform MEFs and ESAs, as well as the number of 
personnel with those skills that are needed to perform the task. In the event that the task must be 
performed 24/7, as is sometimes the case with monitoring shelter occupants, it should be made 
clear how many shifts are required, how long those shifts are, and how many personnel are 
required for each shift. The list of personnel should be simple, showing only the optimal number 
of personnel with each skill needed. For example, to check people into a shelter for the night the 
following personnel may be needed  during operations–  
2 people who can swipe ID or resident cards on the check-in system 
2 people to issue ID cards to new residents for use in future check-ins 
2 people on outdoor line control 
2 people manning the information desk 
1 person to give verbal directions to shelter facilities and to shelter beds 
 For nonprofit organizations, this may be a difficult step. Many tasks at a shelter or other 
sites may be performed normally by volunteers who are overseen by agency staff. Volunteers 
may not be available in the event that a site has suffered enough damage to require the activation 
of its COOP plan. This can be solved in a number of different ways. One way to solve this issue 
is to fill holes left by volunteer vacancies with existing staff, assuming that the skills necessary to 
perform volunteer tasks do not require any special, in-depth knowledge or training. Staff or 
volunteers may be drawn from other agency sites as needed to fill holes. If this is not practical, 
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due to conflicts with scheduling or multiple-site activations, it may be possible to fill the holes 
with temporary employees hired specifically to cover for volunteer vacancies. These temporary 
employees can be dismissed after the site has been restored.  
If temporary employees would cost too much,  or would take too long to hire, a third 
option might be to recruit volunteers specifically with the skills necessary who are asked to be 
present specifically when the COOP plan needs to be activated. These volunteers can be trained 
specifically for these situations, cross-trained between different tasks, and used to fill staff and 
volunteer vacancies where needed. Another option may be to simply fold tasks into one another 
or remove tasks that are only “nice to have.” For example, in the above sample list of necessary 
staff, it may be easier to have the person doing check-ins also give verbal instructions as to 
where the person needing shelter needs to go next, or where facilities are, as opposed to having a 
“greeter” position.  
 Each MEF and ESA should have a list of staff and skill requirements, as well as a plan to 
perform these tasks in the event of a staffing shortage during a disaster. In addition, FEMA states 
that “For agencies with multiple MEFs, give consideration to identifying personnel who may 
support more than one MEF; this will help to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. C5). If four MEFs at a site require that 
someone inventory supplies and handle purchase orders, it may be best to have one person 






Identify IT and Communication Needs 
  
In this step the planner must identify the communication and computer systems needed to 
perform MEFs. For example, if a computer and network connection are needed for shelter check-
in, those would be listed. Other things that might be listed include landline phones, cellphones, 
fax machines, photocopiers, radios, and printers. If the item is necessary for any part of an 
essential task it should be listed. The planner should also identify ways to provide 
communication and IT equipment in the event that existing equipment is damaged or otherwise 
unavailable (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. H1). 
Identify Alternate Site Requirements 
  
Alternate sites for services should be established in the event that the primary site sustains so 
much damage that it is not possible to perform MEFs at all. For example, a shelter site may still 
be able to provide food and shelter services if the intake area is severely damaged in a fire; 
alternate sites only need to be identified for intake functions. If half of the building collapses in 
an earthquake, however, one or both of those functions could be severely impacted or disabled 
entirely. Alternate sites do not need to be permanent, but should  allow agency staff to perform 
MEFs and ESAs until original sites have been restored or replaced. FEMA suggests using 
alternate sites to replace only those functions deemed essential, not to replace every function 
performed by the agency (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. C6). Alternate 
sites can be anything, so long as the MEF can be performed from them. If the room where shelter 
beds are kept is damaged or destroyed, something as simple as setting up emergency folding 
beds in an open space like a storage warehouse or, weather permitting, the parking lot can suffice 
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in an extreme case. If the agency has an alternate site used for seasonal purposes, like the use of 
a winter shelter to handle overflow in heavy-use months, it may be beneficial to activate the site 
early for use during a disaster. 
 Planners should keep in mind the minimum requirements needed in order for them to use 
an alternate site. Alternate sites should have the following capabilities (Edwards, Goodrich, & 
Medigovich, 2011, p. 10.1)–  
 Enough space for supplies, equipment, and staff 
 Ability to perform functions by the RTO requirement of each MEF and for up to 
thirty days 
 Reliable logistical support, infrastructure, and service systems 
 Communications and IT equipment 
 Be safe enough for incoming clients and staff. 
Identify Relocation Process Options (Devolution) 
  
“A continuity plan’s devolution option addresses how an organization will identify and transfer 
responsibility for the performance of essential functions to personnel at a location that offers a 
safe and secure environment in which essential functions can continue” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2013a, p. L1). The planner should identify how MEF operations will be 
transferred to alternate sites in the event that the primary site is rendered unusable. For each 
MEF, list the available options to quickly transfer equipment, staff, records, supplies, and 




Identify Resources Needed for MEF 
 
In this step, the planner must identify everything that is needed to perform related ESAs or 
MEFs. For example, equipment would include things like stoves for a kitchen, the beds in a 
shelter, or even the van for a mobile clinic. Supplies would be smaller things like utensils, 
bedding, or fuel for the van. This section can also include any critical infrastructure needed to 
perform the MEF. If a MEF’s output is food delivery to other shelter sites, and it relies on the use 
of a particular freeway, that information should be on the data sheet. Should that freeway 
become damaged or otherwise unavailable, alternate routes would need to be set.  
Identify Vital Records 
 
Vital records are “…information systems technology, applications, and infrastructure, electronic 
and hardcopy documents, references, and records needed to support the continued performance 
of essential functions during a continuity activation” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013c, p. I1). This includes any vital records and databases needed to perform ESA or MEF 
duties. These can include client files, emergency plans, payroll records, donor information, 
program manuals, and anything else that supports the performance of the MEF.  
Identify Funding Sources 
 
This step involves “…identifying funding sources to sustain the continuity capability throughout 
the disruption and to continue performance of the MEF and essential supporting activities” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. I1). The planner should identify all funding 
sources needed to continue site operations during a disaster. Funding sources should be included 
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for items normally replaced through donations, as it may be necessary to purchase supplies with 
short notice. Any costs that can be reimbursed through a private or government funder should 
also be noted, as well as potential donations if it can be safely assumed that those funds will 
exist. Nonprofits should also leverage their donor networks in extreme situations and request 
assistance from the community and local businesses where possible. 
Identify Interdependencies 
 
For this step, the planner should determine what external or internal parties provide goods or 
perform services that are required to perform the MEF. The name of the party, its contact 
information, what they provide, when they provide it, and whether they can provide it during a 
disaster are all important information to record. This should be done for internal and external 
parties. 
“Map” the Process 
 
After all of the above information has been collected for the MEF, the final step is to map the 
entire process out from beginning to end. This can either be a narrative description or a diagram. 
The purpose of this “map” is to put all of the gathered information into an easy-to-understand 
document that can be understood by someone who is not intimately familiar with the process. 
The map may even be a simple numbered list of tasks, with each task’s inputs and outputs 
detailed in outline format. Once this step has been completed for each identified MEF, it is time 







A risk assessment should be performed in order to determine what events could occur that will 
cause a disruption to MEF operations. These events could be internal or external and may not 
necessarily be natural disasters. Conducting a risk assessment helps to “…identify, assess, and 
then mitigate the risk” (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 2006, p. 2.5). This task is 
important because it will always be better to minimize, or prevent entirely, disruptions to 
essential functions during a disaster. Through this assessment the planner will identify –  
1. Potential external and internal events that could threaten site operations; 
2. The probability that these events will occur;  
3. The impact to each MEF should an identified event occur;  
4. Processes and procedures already in place that eliminate or control events to prevent or 
minimize the effects of a disaster. 
It is suggested that the planner use a worksheet during this process to keep track of 
identified information. A blank worksheet is provided on Appendix B-7. 
Identify Risks to MEF Operations 
 
Identifying potential threats will require that time be spent looking into the background of the 
area and the site. Since states are required to create Disaster Mitigation Plans (Disaster 
Mitigation Act, 2000), and many local governments have Emergency Operations Plans with a 
risk analysis, such plans can be a good resource for developing an organization’s risk 
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assessment. Risks can be broken into three categories: naturally occurring events, technological 
events, and human-caused events. Naturally occurring events are things like earthquakes, 
wildfires, or tsunamis. An important point when examining natural disasters is the potential for 
some to cascade into other types of disasters. “Natural hazards that cascade are clearly more 
difficult to manage, and their consequences may continue to build…” (Edwards & Goodrich, 
2011, p. 2.10). For example, a hurricane can cause wind damage and severe flooding, both of 
which can cause other problems. When planning for a disaster with the potential to cascade into 
other problems, the planner should account for each possible problem that the event will bring. 
 Technological events “…result from the technology used in modern communities” 
(Edwards & Goodrich, 2011, p. 2.11). Technological events include power outages, releases of 
hazardous materials into the environment, or damaged water pipes that prevent the use of a site’s 
normal water supply. Human-caused events include are those that can be caused either through 
intent or by accident. A fire could be started on-site by either an accident in the kitchen or by a 
disgruntled client intending to damage the building. A human-caused event may not even seem 
like it would be a long-term event at first. A violent incident on-site, such as a shooting or sexual 
assault, may appear to be something that could be handled quickly by local police so that normal 
operations can resume. The planner should remember that human-caused and technological 
events can also cascade. For example, “…workplace violence has led to buildings being declared 
crime scenes and becoming inaccessible for days to weeks” (Edwards, Goodrich, & Medigovich, 
2011, p. 6.7).  
 When all risks have been identified, the planner should have a list of natural, 
technological, or human-caused events that have occurred, or could occur, in the area or on the 
site. This list should be further broken down so that each event is applied to each site, or 
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department on-site, that can be affected. For example, the planner could have “Fire” as a natural 
event, which is broken down into “Fire in Kitchen,” “Fire in Sleeping Area” and “External 
Fires.”  
Determine the Likelihood of Events 
 
In the Threat and Hazard Identification Guide developed by FEMA it is noted that planners 
should only select risks that could reasonably occur (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013d, p. 7). Hurricanes do not occur in the San Francisco bay area so they can be safely 
discounted in that area. FEMA further states that “Communities should take care to not over-rely 
on historical averages or patterns that may give a false sense of likelihood” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2013d, p. 8). Earthquakes are a regular occurrence in California, but there 
are rarely any large ones capable of causing severe damage. The  2014 South Napa earthquake 
was the largest earthquake in the bay area since Loma Prieta, which occurred in 1989, and there 
were twenty-five years between them (Berlinger, Levs, & Capelouto, 2014).  Simply using 
historical data could mean that a planner might conclude that his organization is safe from major 
earthquakes in the bay area for another 25 years, however there are other active faults that could 
rupture at any time. This principle can be applied to human-caused and technological threats as 
well.  
Items to consider in determining the probability of a specific disaster should include, but 
not be limited to: geographic location, topography of the area, proximity to major sources 
of power, bodies of water and airports, degree of accessibility to facilities within the 
organization, history of local utility companies in providing uninterrupted services, 
history of the area’s susceptibility to natural threats, proximity to major highways which 




 DRII suggests using the following as guidelines for setting probabilities (Disaster 
Recovery Institute International, 2006, p. 2.18). The planner should assign a value to the 
likelihood of each event occurring. Wold and Shriver (2010) recommend using the following 
values: Low = 1, Medium = 5, High = 10- 
 Low Probability of Exposure - 1 
o Occurs less than once every twenty-five years 
 Major earthquakes in the Bay Area 
 Medium Probability of Exposure - 5 
o Occurs once every five to twenty-five years 
 Tornados in Santa Clara County 
 High Probability of Exposure - 10 
o Occurs more than once every five years 
 Fires in California 
Aside from the probability of the event actually occurring, the planner should take into 
consideration whether or not an event will actually affect MEF performance.  
Identify Impacts 
 
After the likelihood of an occurrence has been determined, the impact of those events on 
different MEFs should be evaluated. Each event-MEF combination will be assigned a numeric 
impact rating. When determining the impact on a function from an event, the planner should 
examine how vulnerable each MEF is to each identified threat. Vulnerabilities are the likelihood 
that an event will have a negative effect on MEFs. Determining how vulnerable a function is will 
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be mostly subjective. “The agency must look separately at how vulnerable its people, facilities, 
communications, resources, interdependencies, and processes are to the effects of each threat…” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013c, p. D7). MEFs that will be minimally affected 
by an event would be considered low-vulnerability and, as a result, would have a lower impact 
rating. For example, if there are multiple shelter sites available, and other sites can easily take on 
extra clients, a single shelter site could be considered as having a low vulnerability to certain 
events and would have a low impact rating. 
It is possible for one MEF to be completely disrupted for a long period of time while 
another MEF in the same building can resume functions almost immediately. For example, a fire 
that destroys the kitchen will probably completely disrupt the “Provide food to clients” MEF. 
However, if the fire is contained before it spreads, the “Provide overnight shelter” MEF may go 
completely unhampered. For that reason, it is important to make sure that each identified event is 
applied to each MEF and that the impact that the event would have on each MEF is rated. Wold 
and Shriver suggest using a three-point scale for rating the MEF impact:  
The impact can be rated as: 0= No impact or interruption in operations, 1= Noticeable 
impact, interruption in operations for up to 8 hours, 2= Damage to equipment and/or 
facilities, interruption in operations for 8 - 48 hours, 3= Major damage to the equipment 
and/or facilities, interruption in operations for more than 48 hours. All main… functions 
must be relocated  
(Shriver & Wold, 2007). 
 
Other factors aside from MEF operations at a particular site should be considered when 
rating MEF impacts. If, as previously mentioned, impacted services can be provided at an 
alternate site without much interruption, the impact may result in a rating of 0 or 1. If only a 
single person can perform a MEF function, and that person will be needed at a different site for 
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an extended period of time, it may result in an impact rating of 2 since the function will have to 
wait for that person to arrive. Any ratings given should be justified by the planner when they are 
assigned so that anyone who reads the ratings will understand how they were determined.  
 After the likelihood of an event and the impact it will have on each affected function have 
been determined, a risk analysis matrix can be created that can identify where the planner’s 
organization’s greatest exposures to risk are. The following is a sample matrix.  
 
Risk Matrix 
Estimated Impact to Function 
LOW = 1 MEDIUM = 2 HIGH = 3 
Event 
Probability 
LOW = 1 1x1 = 1 1x2 = 2 1x3 = 3 
MEDIUM = 5 5x1 = 5 5x2 = 10 5x3 = 15 
HIGH = 10 10x1 = 1 10x2 = 20 10x3 = 30 
Table 4: Sample Risk Matrix - Adapted from DRII 2006, p. 2.20 
 Using this matrix, it will be possible to estimate how at-risk each identified MEF is from 
different types of events. By multiplying the probability rating by the impact rating, the planner 
will have a numeric representation of risk. The following table shows some possible effects of 
each risk rating. 
Risk Effects 
LOW RISK 
1 - 3 
MEDIUM RISK 
4 - 14 
HIGH RISK 
15 - 30 
MEF Availability Periodic reductions in service 
Intermittent total loss or serious 
reduction in service 
No service available 
Duration of Outage Less than .5 days Between .5 and 3 days More than 3 days 
Affected Individuals Impacts staff or volunteers Impacts clients Impacts entire community 
Table 5: Identifying Impact Ratings - Adapted from DRII 2006, p. 2.21 
As an example, assume that a fire breaking out in the kitchen area of a shelter site has a 
probability of “Medium.” Now assume that a kitchen fire has an impact of “Low” on the MEF 
“Provide overnight shelter,” an impact of “Medium” on the MEF “Provide shower/cleaning 
facilities” due to kitchen/shower proximity, and an impact of “High” on the MEF “Provide 
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lunches and dinners to clients.” Using the matrix, each MEF would be assigned a different risk 
rating for the same event. In this case, a fire in the kitchen would result in risks of 5, 10, and 20 
for the shelter, showers, and food distribution functions. The shelter area’s risk from a kitchen 
fire is low, the shower facility’s risk is medium, and the kitchen’s risk is high. This example is 
displayed below. 
Kitchen Fire Effects on Likelihood of Fire Impact to MEF Risk Level 
Kitchen Services Medium (5) High (3) =15 – High Risk 
Shelter Services Medium (5) Low (1) =5 – Low Risk 
Shower Services Medium (5) Medium (2) =10 – Medium Risk 




Whenever possible, it is always better to prevent a disruption from occurring than to have to 
react to the disruption. Prevention and mitigation measures may not always be able to prevent an 
event, but they can stop the impact to MEF operations (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 
2006, p. 2.24). “Mitigation strategies are those actions taken by an organization to reduce risks 
resulting from threats and hazards and to ensure the continued performance of MEFs” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p. E1). Prevention, which is preferable but not always 
possible, will block all impacts to a MEF. If an event cannot be fully prevented, it is better to 
control the risk and reduce its impact. Both of these are accomplished through controls. 
 Controls “…lessen the chance of a risk causing a disaster or will mitigate the impact or 
damage if the disaster occurs” (Disaster Recovery Institute International, 2006, p. 2.24). Controls 
are absolutely essential for functions that are at risk of interruption, and can also help low-risk 
operations continue smoothly in the event that they are also interrupted. DRII has identified two 
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types of controls that should be examined: physical controls such as fire suppression systems or 
access control systems, and procedural controls like document receipting or making certain that 
all of the stove burners in the kitchen have been turned off (Disaster Recovery Institute 
International, 2006, p. 2.25). Controls of either type can be used to prevent or mitigate impacts. 
Controls can also be used to protect vital records required for each MEF, though they might take 
different forms. Controls for vital records might include physical or online backups, off-site 
copies, or scans saved to a compact disc. 
 Keep in mind that not all “events” will be large, obvious disasters. If something is 
capable of halting MEF performance, no matter how small it is, it is a concern that needs to be 
controlled for. If an overnight shelter has twenty wooden beds for overnight use, and a termite 
infestation from a nearby woodland area occurs and destroys most of the beds, the planner had 
better have replacement alternatives on-hand or readily available by the RTO requirement. 
In the prevention and mitigation phase, the planner will attempt to address areas 
identified in the BIA as high-risk by finding feasible prevention and mitigation options for each 
one. A blank worksheet for use during this process can be found on Appendix B-8. 
Examining Potential Prevention/Mitigation Options 
 
The planner should first review the results of the BIA and determine where the greatest 
operational risks are. This is easily done by reviewing the Impact Ratings for each essential 
function, although things like contract needs or management requests may make some a higher 
review priority than others. The planner should start by examining what controls are already in 
place and evaluating each one according to its costs to the organization and how well they can 
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deter an event or mitigate impact. A shelter kitchen may have nothing more than a smoke 
detector inside of it to warn others of fire. While this will give enough warning to evacuate and 
allow staff to call the fire department, it would not actually do anything to prevent the fire from 
starting. Note that while some controls have a small effect, none is completely useless. In the 
case of the smoke detector it can help mitigate the fire’s impact by safeguarding lives and 
allowing someone to summon the fire department or locate an extinguisher. It is always better, 
though, to do as much impact mitigation as possible. When examining controls, the planner 
should make sure he is looking into both physical and procedural controls. 
 After existing controls have been identified, the planner can proceed in two ways. First, if 
the planner has determined that the existing controls are sufficient, he should document the 
existing controls that are already in place, how the controls are effectively preventing or will 
effectively mitigate an impact, the existing costs for the controls, and how it was concluded that 
no further controls are needed. If it is determined that the existing controls are insufficient and 
that more are needed, the planner will need to determine what kinds of controls are needed to 
sufficiently prevent an event or mitigate its impact after it occurs. There are a large number of 
potential controls for events and the planner will need to research them thoroughly to determine 
what will work best for them. Some criteria might include control costs to start up and maintain, 
controls that prevent an event vs. controls that only mitigate impacts, ease of use, or whether a 
control can handle multiple types of events. Additional controls will need to be presented to, and 
approved by, agency leadership. Any approved changes that are implemented should be reflected 
in the plan and the impact rating should be updated. 
Continuing the kitchen fire example, it is clearly unacceptable to rely solely on a smoke 
detector in the event that there is a fire. It does not address possible procedural issues that could 
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cause a fire, it ignores that there are manual or automated options to extinguish the fire available, 
and it puts lives and property at risk in the event that the detector fails. Possible physical controls 
could be an automated sprinkler system, placing a fire extinguisher in (or very close to) the 
kitchen, or the installation of fire-dampers to prevent fire spread. Procedural controls could be a 
nightly check that stoves are turned off, or making sure that staff and volunteers are adequately 
trained on fire safety and kitchen equipment. The planner should also examine insurance options 
to mitigate monetary impacts, such as replacement costs for equipment. If an agency has to 
spend too much money replacing equipment it will be unable to perform one or more MEFs at 
all, defeating the purpose of the COOP plan.  
Another type of control to be aware of is the establishment of succession lines for 
leadership. If critical leadership is unavailable for any reason their authority needs to be moved 
to another employee, especially if leadership is essential to MEF operations. “It is critical to have 
a clear line of succession established in the event an organization’s leadership becomes 
debilitated or incapable of performing its legal and authorized duties, roles, and responsibilities” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013a, p. E1). Any leadership position should have at 
least three alternates. If necessary, leadership from other sites can be brought in to cover for the 
missing leader. The planner should create a list of staff who can take on these responsibilities. 
Where possible, staff who work at different sites should be selected to avoid losing all leadership 
staff in a disaster. This list should list position titles, not names (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2013a, p. E1). This will make keeping the plan updated easier in the event 
of staff turnover. 
Finally, while controls are very good at preventing and mitigating events, it should never 
be assumed that they are foolproof. There may be an event that shuts down a MEF entirely 
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regardless of controls. The planner should prepare for the possibility that certain key pieces of 
equipment, infrastructure, or processes will fail during an event. Equipment can include things 
like stoves for the kitchen, beds for the shelter, computers for the administrative staff, or trucks 
for food delivery staff. It is possible that any of these pieces of equipment can be damaged 
beyond use during a disaster, and controls should exist to mitigate the results. Regular 
maintenance and replacing old or obsolete equipment are good controls to put into place, but the 
planner should determine where different equipment can be quickly obtained, rented, or 
borrowed if a failure occurs. For example, delivery trucks can be rented if necessary.  
 Once the controls have been evaluated for each event, and each MEF affected by each 
event, the planner should present his findings to agency leadership. The planner will need to 
show how each MEF can be impacted by each event, how well (or poorly) existing controls will 
prevent or manage the impacts and how they can be improved, and what controls need to be 
added in order to improve mitigation and prevention. As part of the last piece, the planner should 
include how much it will cost to implement the control, as well as how much it will cost to 
maintain over time and the costs to the agency and the community in the event that the MEF is 















An emergency response plan handles the immediate response in the seconds and minutes after an 
event, such as performing an evacuation or dialing 9-1-1. During the event itself the agency 
should not be focused on performing MEFs – if the building is burning or collapsing it is not the 
time to worry about services! An organization should have a comprehensive emergency response 
plan that focuses on saving lives and preventing further damage. FEMA provides free guidance 




After the response phase ends and the emergency is over, a team will be needed to examine the 
situation to determine whether or not to activate continuity operations. The planner should create 
a team consisting of site leadership and any other staff who are capable of identifying serious 
problems with MEF functions. This team will examine critical infrastructure, equipment, 
supplies, and so on, and determine whether to activate the COOP plan and, if so, where efforts 
need to be focused. If the team finds that there are no significant impacts to MEFs the agency 
can return to normal operations. The team will need to determine the following: 
1. Is the building damaged such that it is unsafe to use or otherwise inaccessible? 
2. Has any critical equipment been damaged or destroyed? 
3. Have critical supplies been damaged or destroyed to the point of insufficiency? 
4. Have vital records been damaged or made otherwise unavailable? 
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5. Have any critical staff or leadership been made unavailable? 
6. Have any critical partners been made unavailable? 
If the answer to any of the above is “yes,” the continuity plan should be activated. 
Depending on the situation, operations may be moved to alternate sites, replacement equipment 
and supplies should be obtained, authority and tasks should be delegated, and so on. Alternative 
sites, equipment, suppliers, and any other alternatives should have been identified in the 
“controls” section as mitigating measures for total failure. A blank form that can be used for 
assessing damage is included on Appendix B-9. 
Plan and EOC Activation 
 
If the decision to activate the COOP plan is made, the first thing that should happen is the 
establishment of an Emergency Operations Center, or EOC. The EOC is “…a physical or virtual 
location from which coordination and support of incident management activities is directed” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). Event response and continuity operations are 
managed from the EOC. FEMA defines an EOC as  
•A physical location. 
•Staffed with personnel trained for and authorized to represent their agency/discipline. 
•Equipped with mechanisms for communicating with the incident site and obtaining 
resources and potential resources  
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010). 
 
In short, the EOC will function as the “nerve center” for staff during continuity 
operations. The EOC needs to be close to the affected site, but should be far enough away  to be 
safe from any cascading events that may occur. If there is a major gas leak, for example, the 
EOC should not be established in the parking lot of the building. During an event, staff at the 
EOC will be the ones who take care of tasks like ordering equipment and supplies, 
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communicating with internal and external partners, communicating with the media, ensuring site 
safety and security, and necessary administrative tasks. The EOC will be the main point of 
communication and instruction for staff and any external parties, so it should consist of agency 
leadership and a member of as many outward-facing departments, like development or media-
relations, as possible. In the event that a task, like interacting with the public, can primarily be 
done via phone or email the team member may be able to telecommute. 
FEMA suggests dividing EOC staff into the following sections,  
1. Management Section Chief – Leads the response to the emergency 
a. Safety Officer – Leads site safety efforts 
b. Agency Liaison Officer – Communicates with outside partners/funders 
c. Public Information Officer – Communicates with media/public 
2. Operations Section– Manages operations throughout event 
3. Planning Section – Documents plans, makes maps and files reports 
4. Logistics Section – Responsible for obtaining resources, equipment, and related 
plans 
5. Finance/Admin Section – Responsible for financial aspects of response and 
recovery  
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012) 

























EOC staffing is flexible and driven by the size and complexity of the event. Ideally, at 
least one person should be assigned to each task. If the agency is particularly small, it may be 
necessary to double-up on tasks. If necessary, similar tasks should be combined, like the Public 
Information Officer position and the Liaison Officer position. Each position should be granted 
the necessary authorities to act on behalf of the agency for continuity-related tasks during the 
event.  
As can be seen above, COOP is a branch of the EOC’s management section. The COOP 
Branch includes the COOP branch director, a Human Capital Unit that deals with staffing and 
personnel issues, an Essential Functions Unit that ensures that MEFs are being performed, and an 
Emergency Relocation Unit that facilitates facility relocation as needed. The COOP branch 
director oversees these units, ensuring that MEF operations continue, that staff are being 
managed, and that any relocation requirements are met. (Edwards & Goodrich, 2011, p. 2.52) 
The COOP Branch Director, along with the officers and section chiefs in the EOC, will report to 
the Management Section Chief, whose job is to oversee the response to the emergency event. 
The EOC, and the COOP branch, will remain active until the event has ended and the 
Management Section Chief can give an all-clear. At that time the EOC may be closed while the 
COOP functions may continue through Recovery. 
Incident response, emergency operation centers, and the continuity branch are all part of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which contains a large amount of 
information on the development of teams, plans, EOCs, and other incident management-related 
topics. Although this guide will not cover the full depth of the subject, there is enough to set up 
teams and give them assignments. For more information on incident management, FEMA 





d.pdf. In addition, FEMA provides a free, online training course on EOC design and operations. 
This course can be found at http://emilms.fema.gov/IS775/EOC0101000.htm. Finally, several 
jurisdictions have created guidance on the subject and provide it for free on their websites. In 
California, all state agencies must use the Standardized Emergency Management System 
(SEMS) for organizing the EOC and local response, and local governments, voluntary agencies 
and the private sector are encouraged to use SEMS. The California Office of Emergency 
Services provides guidance documents at its website, www.oes.ca.gov/plans. 
Continuity Plan Creation 
 
The planner will need to compile all of the information necessary to perform the agency’s MEFs. 
The planner will need the following information from the MEF datasheets and the risk analysis: 
1. A list of all identified hazard events 
a. This information should include the events, the probability of their 
occurrence, and their impacts on each essential function 
2. All identified MEFs and their related BPA worksheets 
3. The established priorities for function restoration 
4. A list of any leadership needed at the site and their assigned alternates 
5. A list of staff who perform functions and their assigned alternates 
The planner will put together a worksheet, or set of worksheets, for each possible event 
and describe the actions to be taken after the immediate response is complete. All of the 
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information needed will be found in the MEF and BPA worksheets or the risk analysis. During 
continuity operations, the organization needs to focus on restoring functions in priority order. 
Priorities were established earlier and, unless there are circumstances preventing it, functions 
should be restored according plan.  The planner will now need to create a list of actions that need 
to be taken for each event. In order to do this, the planner needs to know:  
1. Required staff 
a. Members of agency leadership required for MEF performance 
b. Staff who normally perform the MEF 
c. Any long-term volunteers who normally perform or support the MEF 
i. Include contact information for all of the above 
ii. Identify any personnel who can telecommute and still perform their 
job functions 
iii. Identify any personnel who would be considered “key” and must either 
be present, be telecommuting, or have their tasks or authority 
delegated. 
2. Alternate staff who can perform MEF tasks 
a. Each position should have at least one alternate 
b. Multiple tasks may be assigned to one staff member 
c. Ensure that leadership has clear lines of delegation in case management 
becomes unavailable.  
3. The critical supplies and equipment for the MEF 
a. Equipment needed for on-site tasks, such as computers, stoves, or beds 
b. Supplies needed to perform MEFs 
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c. Mobile equipment like laptops, cellphones, or radios 
4. Sources for replacements of damaged equipment 
a. Regular vendors and their contact information 
b. Alternate vendors for one-time use in an emergency if regular vendors are 
unable to deliver and may affect the ability to restore a function by the RTO 
requirement. 
5. Sources for alternate supplies 
6. Vital records for each MEF 
a. What are they, where are they kept, where the backups are kept, is a key or 
password needed, and related details.  
7. Critical infrastructure for each MEF 
a. Include all buildings and roads that are needed to perform the MEF under 
normal conditions 
i. If the MEF relies on travelling on local roads or freeways, include a 
map showing the normal routes 
8. Alternate infrastructure for each MEF 
a. All identified alternate sites for use during continuity operations 
i. Ensure that sites meet all MEF requirements before committing to use 
b. A list or map of alternate routes will be needed for any transportation-related 
MEFs 
9. A list of external partners for each MEF that includes 
a. The organization they represent 
b. The contact names and numbers/emails for each partner 
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10. The “process map” from the BPA process, detailing what needs to be done in order to 
actually accomplish the tasks involved in completing the MEF 
After all of the above information has been gathered from the source documents, the 
planner can begin creating continuity worksheets that will give specific instructions regarding 
what needs to be done in order to successfully restore and perform MEFs, who needs to perform 
which tasks, what equipment and supplies are needed, and so on. There will be one worksheet 
for each event describing the continuity processes for each affected MEF. Note that a single 
worksheet may go longer than one page, depending on the amount of information that needs to 
be on it. It is recommended that worksheets be printed on both sides of a page to minimize the 
number of papers a person may have to look at.  
A sample sheet will be provided here that demonstrates a variety of worksheet inputs 
with no particular event in mind. The purpose of the sample is to show what each component 














Sample Continuity Worksheet 
Site:        Probability: 
Event:         Impact:  
MEFs Affected 
(Includes associated ESAs) 
Overnight Shelter – Priority A – Restore within 4 hours 
Food Distribution – Priority A – Restore within 12 hours 
Shower/Restroom Facilities – Priority B = Restore within 24 hours 
Case Management Services – Priority B = Restore within 36 hours 
Service Referrals – Priority C – Restore within 15 days 
Mobile Clinic Use – Priority C – Restore within 30 days 
List all MEFs that can be affected by the event 
Staff Responsible Site Leadership – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
  Alternate : (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
 
For each MEF, list the names and contact information for all related staff, all related 
volunteers, and all of their assigned alternates 
Communication Needs Phones – Land Lines, Cellphones 
Two-Way radios 
Email 
List all means of communication necessary to perform affected MEFs 
Necessary Actions and Alternatives Contact all external partners who may rely on, or provide services for, affected MEFs 
Shelter Activities (Shift times) 
Prepare beds – Performed by X VOLUNTEER(S)– supervised by STAFF MEMBER 
  If event has damaged supplies and more are needed, refer to replacement section 
  If event has damaged beds or rendered them inaccessible, activate alternate site 
Perform intakes – Performed by X STAFF MEMBER(S) 
  If event shuts down intake computers – Switch to paper intakes, store at front desk 
  If event blocks main entrance – Redirect clients to entrance on DIRECTION side 
Kitchen Activities (Shift times) 
Prepare food – Performed by X VOLUNTEER(S) and Y STAFF MEMBER(S) 
  If event has damaged stoves, prepare no-cook meals from refrigerator 
  If event has damaged stoves and ruined supplies, activate alternate site 
Distribute food – Performed by X VOLUNTEER(S) and Y STAFF MEMBER(S) 
  If event has blocked access to dining area, activate alternate site 
  If event has damaged dining supplies, refer to replacement section 
List the functions, alternatives, and  staff/volunteer requirements for each affected 
MEF 
Alternate Site Activations Overnight Shelter Activities –  
Activate winter shelter site early OR 
Redirect shelter users to shelter site 2 OR 
Contact shelter partner agencies and request assistance OR 
Request emergency hotel vouchers from funder (Extreme weather only) 
Food Distribution Activities –  
Set up outdoor cooking equipment/tables if available OR 
Distribute food using only non-cook supplies OR 
Redirect clients to shelter site 2 OR 
Redirect clients to other distribution centers 
List the alternate site options for each affected MEF 
Devolution Procedures Shelter Operations – Activate Winter Shelter 
Contact winter shelter site owners to request permission to use site for emergency 
If permission is granted – 
  Inform shelter team of transition requirement 
  Instruct front desk to inform incoming clients of location change 
  Inform existing clients of need to transfer to winter shelter site 
  Once shelter operations at primary site have ceased, relocate staff/supplies to winter    
    site 
If permission is denied –  
Contact shelter site 2 and request beds 
For each alternate site/MEF, describe the devolution process 
Critical Equipment & Existing 
Replacement Inventory 
Shelter 
Beds (25) – located at winter shelter 
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Fold-out Beds (20) – located in warehouse 
Kitchen 
Portable Stove – located in warehouse 
Small microwaves (2) – located in warehouse 
List the replacement options for all critical equipment that is unusable 
Critical Supplies & Existing 
Replacement Inventory 
Shelter 
Sheets (50) – located in warehouse AND winter shelter 
Blankets (50) located in warehouse AND winter shelter 
Kitchen 
Cooking utensils – located in warehouse 
List the replacement options for all critical supplies that are unavailable 
Vital Records & Backup Locations If needed, records are to be transported to ALTERNATE SITE by STAFF MEMBER 
Client Files – Located on second floor office area – requires cabinet keys 
 File scans are uploaded to agency servers located at SITE 
Intake Records – Located at front desk on first floor – requires cabinet keys 
 Record scans are uploaded to agency servers located at SITE 
List the records and their backup locations for all vital records 
Locations and Contacts for 
Replacements 
Shelter Beds – VENDOR NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Stoves – VENDOR NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Computers – VENDOR NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX  
Vital Record Backups – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Dining Room Tables – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Dining Utensils – STORE NAME – STORE LOCATION – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Non-Cook Food – STORE NAME – STORE LOCATION – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
List the names, contact information, and locations of all vendors who can be contacted 
regarding the replacement of unusable equipment and supplies. If a third-party 
manages databases, IT, and digital records, include their information. 
External Partner Contacts CITY – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
COUNTY – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
PARTNER AGENCY – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
WINTER SHELTER SITE OWNER – CONTACT NAME – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
List the agencies, contact names, and contact information of any external partners who 
fund or may rely on MEF performance 
Other Contacts UTILITY PROVIDER – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
PHONE PROVIDER – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
INTERNET PROVIDER – (XXX) XXX-XXXX 
Table 8: Sample Continuity Worksheet 
The planner will need one sheet for each event. The following explains how to put the 
sheet together. 
1. Identify the site affected, the event occurring, the probability of the event, and the 
impact of the event 
2. Identify all MEFs that will be affected by the event and list them in priority order. 
Include their RTOs for clarification 
3. Identify necessary site leadership and all staff and any regular volunteers who are 
required to perform each affected MEF. For leadership and staff, identify all 
alternates and lines of authority. 
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4. Identify all tools needed to communicate internally or externally. 
5. Identify all actions required to perform each MEF and who will perform them. 
Identify staffing and volunteer needs for each action. For each potential 
interruption, like site inaccessibility, technology failures, or damaged equipment, 
include all identified alternative actions. Functions that have more than one shift 
should identify how many shifts are needed and how many staff and volunteers 
are needed for each 
6. Identify the alternate sites for each function and all of the processes necessary to 
relocate to those sites if necessary. 
7. Identify the critical equipment (stoves, beds, computers) for each MEF. List the 
location and amount of all on-site replacements 
8. Identify the critical supplies (food, bedding, utensils) for each MEF. List the 
location and amount of all on-site replacements 
9. Identify all records required in the performance of each MEF. List the location of 
any digital backups, paper copies, and media backups like CDs or tape drives. 
Also, determine how records will get to alternate sites and who is responsible for 
transporting them. 
10. Identify vendors and stores where replacement equipment and supplies can be 
quickly obtained in an emergency. Include the names of vendor contacts and their 
contact information. Also include any local stores that could be used to purchase 
any equipment or supplies directly, their contact information, and their locations. 
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11. List all partner agencies and government entities who may be impacted by MEF 
failures. Include the name of the organization, the primary contact, and their 
contact information. 
12. List any other parties who may need to be contacted. Include the organization, the 
contact name (if available), and their contact information 
In order to help facilitate smooth continuity operations, a few items, specifically those 
that might be shared across all events (meaning those items equally applicable for, say, a fire and 
an earthquake,) need to be documented in one place so that anyone who needs the information 
can find it. The following items should be included with the plan: 
1. A list of all people who should be contacted regarding an event who will not 
actually contribute to continuity operations. This will mostly be agency 
leadership. 
2. A call tree showing who needs to be contacted and in what order when continuity 
operations begin 
3. A list of authority delegations 
4. A list of any keys or passwords and where to find them or their copies. For 
passwords, the name of the person who can reset them should be included here 
5. A list of established disaster response teams (Damage Assessment Team, 
Continuity Branch staff or EOC staff, for example) and what their tasks are 
6. A list of emergency numbers for local police, fire, medical, public utilities, and so 
on 
7. A list of pre-approved vendors to be contacted first regarding replacement or 
repair of damaged equipment and supplies 
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8. EOC locations, staff members, and contact information 
9. Locations and counts of current replacement inventories 
No specific format for these items needs to be followed, but they should be in each site’s 
COOP plan. 
Reconstitution and Return to Normal Operations 
 
“Reconstitution requirements address the need for organizations to identify, develop, and 
coordinate a plan to return to normal operations once leadership determines that the actual 
emergency, or the threat of an emergency, is over” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013a, p. M1). Agency leadership will determine that the need for continuity operations has 
passed and inform the Continuity Branch. The damage assessment team will determine whether 
the original site or affected facilities can still be used. After that determination is made, the 
Emergency Relocation Group will need to begin whatever actions are necessary to resume 
operations at the original site, at a temporary location until the original site is available, or at a 
new site. 
Reconstitution will include: 
1) Transitioning functions to a temporary site or to a new permanent site 
2) Addressing damage to critical infrastructure 
3) Recovering any salvageable equipment, supplies, or records. 
4) Replacing or repairing damaged equipment and supplies 
5) Replenishing supplies to their normal operating levels 
6) Determining if any vital records were lost and how they can be recovered 
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7) Determining whether it is time to return to normal operations 
8) Communicating to agency leadership and non-Continuity  staff when the 
situation has ended 
The planner and the Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) will need to determine how 
reconstitution efforts will be focused and, as necessary, how to transition organizational 
operations to a permanent or temporary operations site. The planner should plan to restore 
operations in priority order and, if services are being transitioned to a new site, they should be 
moved in that order. After MEFs have been fully restored the ERG should then begin focusing 
on restoring any deferrable essential functions, followed by any functions that were deemed non-
essential. After all functions have been successfully restored or fully relocated, the ERG should 
begin cessation of all continuity activities at the temporary continuity site(s). Once continuity 
operations have been completed, the ERG should inform agency leadership, who can deactivate 
the continuity plan and inform relevant staff and partners that operations have been restored. 
Once normal operations have resumed, the ERG should create an after-action report 
(AAR). After-action reports are used in “identifying lessons learned, best practices, and 
improvement needs and documenting those findings” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2011, pp. 2-3). The AAR “…will offer insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the agency’s 
COOP program (Edwards, Goodrich, & Medigovich, 2011, p. B42). The ERG staff will meet 
and document the performance of the plan and what needs to be improved in order to make 
future continuity operations more successful. Possible topics could be what supplies or 
equipment were missing, the ease of using the continuity plan, or reviews of anything that went 
wrong. This information should be documented and incorporated into the existing continuity 





In the recovery phase, site staff and agency leadership will determine how much equipment and 
infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. Once that has been determined, insurance companies 
and, if they are funding replacements, funders can be contacted regarding replacing items or 
reimbursing the agency for any payments that were made during continuity operations to restore 
MEF functionality. Recovery relies heavily on business processes the organization should 
already have in place for replacing items via vendors, insurance, and funders. Planners are 
encouraged to rely on the existing processes, which should be used after the event has passed. 
TESTING, TRAINING, AND EXERCISING 
 
Testing, training, and exercising, or TT&E, helps ensure “…that an agency’s COOP plan is 
capable of supporting the continued execution of its essential functions throughout the duration 
of the COOP situation” (Edwards & Goodrich, 2011, p. B44). TT&E is, obviously, broken into 




Testing is the easiest of the three components. The planner should arrange to have a variety of 
drills based around potential hazards performed. Fire, earthquake, and flood drills that test staff’s 
ability to manage the initial response to an event will aid them greatly when an actual event 
occurs. IT, electronic backup, and communication functions should also be tested, which may be 
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as simple as “cutting the cord” on internet capabilities. These drills should be performed at least 
annually. Any equipment or supplies that may fail, possibly due to going unused before use as a 
replacement, should be tested annually to ensure that it is still capable of functioning during a 
continuity event. Ideally, and where possible, equipment and supplies should be rotated 
occasionally to keep them “warm.” Any records that are stored on physical media should be 
checked annually to make sure that they are still functioning. Finally, any mitigating or 
preventive controls should be tested in order to ensure that they are doing their jobs. 
After each test, the staff members in charge of administering it should create an AAR 
using their observations of events during the drill and any input from participating staff. If there 
are weaknesses in the plan, it needs to be adjusted in order to eliminate the problem. If any 
equipment or backups are not working, replace them. If controls are not adequately mitigating 
risk, re-examine them and find alternatives. If leadership feels it is necessary, drills should be run 
regularly throughout the year until staff members are comfortable with the response and 
continuity plans and plan weaknesses have been eliminated. 
Training 
 
“Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in support of the 
performance of an organization’s essential functions during a continuity event” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013a, p. K1). Agency leadership should ensure that all staff, 
regardless of position and whether they are temporary workers or contractors, know their roles in 
an emergency or continuity situation. Staff at different sites should know what their site’s 
essential functions are and the plans in place to protect them, like relocation plans and response 
plans. Training should also include proper use of equipment in order to prevent accidents, 
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locations of supplies, and anything else that staff members may need to know if they suddenly 
need to handle a function not normally tied to their positions. Staff members should also know 
where emergency keys are and the location of vital records. 
Exercises 
 
Exercises are extremely important and will help leadership and planners determine where the 
weaknesses in their continuity plans are before an event occurs. Exercises give the Continuity 
team the opportunity to “demonstrate their familiarity with continuity plans and procedures and 
to demonstrate the organization’s capability to continue its essential functions” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013a, p. K3). They also give site staff the opportunity to 
practice their tasks in a simulated continuity situation, rather than waiting until an actual 
emergency to find out if they are unprepared. Through exercises, staff are also given a chance to 
perform the response, continuity, and reconstitution plans and give their input regarding the 
plans during in the AAR. Exercises will also let planners find out how suitable their identified 
alternate sites are. It would be a serious setback if an event occurred that necessitated the 
transferring of operations to an alternate site, and traffic (which may be worse in certain events) 
and distance make it unfeasible to set up operations before RTO.  
Continuity exercises can range in scope from a single function, such as the kitchen, to the 
entire organization. Wherever possible, the organization should try to include all staff who will 
be responding and any external partners who would be affected by a MEF failure. It may even be 
possible to involve members of the local community and volunteers in the exercise. Exercises 
should be planned out as far in advance as possible and should test realistic situations that will 
actually occur. During exercises, the entire continuity plan should be worked through in order to 
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find particular strengths and weaknesses. At the end of any exercise, as with actual events and 
drills, an AAR should be completed to determine where plan weaknesses exist and where 
improvements can be made. 
Continuity exercises are a complex undertaking that require a lot of planning and 
preparation. Development of exercises is beyond the scope of this guide, but some basic 
guidance has been provided above so that the planner can get started and hold  his own exercises. 
For a thorough look at how to design continuity exercises, consult the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, located at 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-8890/hseep_apr13_.pdf . FEMA 
also provides pre-made exercises for a variety of events at http://www.fema.gov/emergency-
planning-exercises . A guide for using the project management approach to exercise 
development is available at http://transweb.sjsu.edu/project/1103.html. 
  
Assembling the Plan 
 
This concludes the guide portion of this document. At this point, the planner should have all of 
the information that he needs to put the plan on paper and present it to leadership for final 
approval. Appendix C contains a sample template that can be used as a guide in completing the 
final product. Once the plan is assembled, presented, and approved, copies should be made for 
each site. The plans should be kept in binders that are clearly labelled as the continuity plan so as 
to avoid confusing the plan with either the emergency response plan or other documents. Staff 
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should know where the binder is and should be able to easily access it in an emergency. The plan 
should have an update history in it that briefly describes changes.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
As mentioned at the beginning, this guide combines COOP guidance into a single document that 
will be simple enough for a planner to pick up and use without needing other manuals. 
Unfortunately for nonprofits, more documentation that covers many aspects of this guide exists, 
but is often spread across multiple manuals, behind paywalls, or is insufficient for any real plan 
development. Unfortunately, aside from Red Cross guidance, little exists on continuity for 
nonprofits and most Red Cross guidance addresses temporary shelters and not a full-scale 
continuity event. 
FEMA has excellent guides, such as the FCD series and the CGC series cited in this 
document, but they are very much aimed at government agencies, not small community service 
providers. They are written in such a way that the average non-government user may find them 
too complex to use. FEMA guidance also requires some knowledge of government terminology 
and, often, requires outside knowledge. Business continuity guidance, aside from being 
expensive, is aimed mostly at continuity for the private sector and assumes the presence of 
extensive resources for all aspects of the planning process. Like FEMA’s guidance, private 
sector guidance is often scattered. Resources will be broken up over multiple training courses 
and manuals, each having its own “entry fee.” Many organizations sell continuity solutions in the 
form of consultancy and templates, but this is still expensive and does not teach organization 
staff to create their own plans. 
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It is recommended that more work be done on creating simple, easy-to-follow, and 
inexpensive COOP plans for use by nonprofit organizations. There are countless sources 
available online for free or through private-sector companies that would be excellent tools for 
nonprofits, but most of it is too complex on its own without some kind of additional training. 
Governments and private enterprises should consider including local non-profits in their training 
events, remembering that the nonprofit agencies – shelters, food banks, clinics, and so on – 
provide the communities where they govern and do their business with indispensable services.  
This is not to put the entire burden on government and private businesses. FEMA offers 
many free training courses online that provide the necessary background knowledge to 
effectively maneuver their manuals. Organizations like the International Association of 
Emergency Managers (IAEM) (www.iaem.com) and the California Emergency Services 
Association (CESA) (www.cesa.net) provide many workshops, trainings, events, and resources 
for a low membership fee. Organizations like Collaborating Agencies Responding to Disasters 
(CARD) (www.cardcanhelp.org), a non-profit agency based in Oakland, CA, can help provide 
training and materials related to COOP and emergency response. Collaborating Agencies 
Disasters Response Efforts (CADRE) (http://www.cadresv.org/about-us/), based in the Silicon 
Valley Red Cross chapter, offers free and low cost training on aspects of emergency 
management for voluntary agencies. National and local chapters of Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disasters (VOAD) (http://www.nvoad.org/) also provide some emergency 
preparedness and response guidance aimed at non-profits. COOP-specific training, however, is 
seldom available.  
Disasters affect all parties in the affected area, not just private businesses and government 
agencies. Nonprofits and the people they serve are an important part of their communities, and 
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they should have access to the same preparation and response tools as other groups. Non-profits 
should include COOP planning in their annual work plans and budgets, and governmental and 
other funders should pay for COOP as an important administrative role.
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A-1: National Essential Functions 
1. Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, 
including the functioning of the three separate branches of government; 
2. Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust and 
confidence of the American people; 
3. Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, 
property, or interests; 
4. Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations; 
5. Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes 
or attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests; 
6. Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences 
of an attack or other incident; 
7. Protecting and stabilizing the Nation’s economy and ensuring public confidence in its 
financial systems; and 
8. Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health,  








A-2: BCM/COOP Laws and Regulations Pre- and Post- 9/11 
 





B-1: Safety Committee and COOP Team Worksheet 
Name Site COOP Team Members 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







B-2:MEF + ESA Identification Worksheet 
Mission vs. Supporting Functions 



























B-3: Mission vs. Non-Mission Functions Worksheet 









B-4: Mission Essential Function Datasheet 
Organization Name:          Date:                      
Name of Function: 
 
 














Recovery Time Objective: 
 
 





















B-5: MEF Prioritization Worksheet 







Interdependencies Priority Rating 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Prepared by:               Date:     
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B-6: Business Process Analysis Worksheet 

















































B-7: Risk Assessment Worksheet 
MEF Analyzed:          Date: 
Description of MEF:  
Type of 
Event 
Description of Event & 





Risk Level Comments 
      
      
      
      
      
      





B-8: Mitigation Worksheet – Existing Controls 
Type of Event:          Date: 
Affected MEF:          Risk Level:  
Description of Impact on MEF: 
 
 




    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Are the existing controls sufficient to prevent or significantly mitigate impacts: 
 
Mitigation Worksheet – Proposed Controls 
Type of Event:          Date: 
Affected MEF:          Risk Level: 
Proposed 
Control 
Description of Proposed Control Advantages of Proposed Control 
Cost to Obtain 
and Operate 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    





B-9: Damage Assessment Worksheet  
Damage Assessment Team: _______________________________________ 
Date: ___________ 
 
Equipment/Infrastructure Condition Salvageable Notes 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    










B-10: Continuity Worksheet 
Site:        Probability: 
Event:         Impact:  
MEFs Affected 
(Includes associated ESAs) 








Staff Responsible For each MEF, list the names and contact information for all 

















Necessary Actions and 
Alternatives 
List the functions, alternatives, and  staff/volunteer requirements 















Critical Equipment & Existing 
Replacement Inventory 







Critical Supplies & Existing 
Replacement Inventory 
 








Vital Records & Backup 
Locations 









Locations and Contacts for 
Replacements 
List the names, contact information, and locations of all vendors 
who can be contacted regarding the replacement of unusable 
equipment and supplies. If a third-party manages databases, IT, 












External Partner Contacts List the agencies, contact names, and contact information of any 






































The purpose of this plan is to have plans on-hand in the event that essential functions are disrupted by 
factors beyond our control. This plan will facilitate the restoration of essential services to the widest 
extent possible in a minimum time frame. ORGANIZATION is committed to identifying options to 
prevent disrupting events and to mitigate the effects of events that occur to the lowest amount possible. 
This plan identifies impacts and recommends necessary measures to prevent extended outages.   
The scope of this plan is limited to [name the organization or the site covered by this plan]. This is a 
business continuity plan, not a daily problem resolution procedures document.  
 





 All necessary staff and volunteers needed to perform essential functions will be present or able to 
reach their assigned locations 
 Initial disaster effects (active fires, evacuations) will be handled by local responders (Police, fire) 
 Equipment and supplies will be obtainable by staff or volunteers and made available as needed 
 At least one identified alternate site will be available if needed and for the duration of operations 
 [Planner should list any other assumptions being made during the creation of the plan] 
 
 






























Summary of Essential Functions 
Mission-Essential Functions (MEFs) are those functions that ORGANIZATION must perform with no or 
little interruption. This can be because of impacts to the community, legal or funder requirements, or 
management instruction. The following is a list of MEFs for SITE. MEFs listed here assume the 
performance of all associated functions needed to complete the MEF. 
 
[List all MEFs here – If this plan is for multiple sites, list by site] 
 
MEF Priorities 
Due to constraints on financial resources and staffing, MEFs have been prioritized according to a number 
of different considerations in order to ensure that appropriate resources are put toward restoring the most 
important functions in a timely manner.  
 
[List each MEF in priority order, along with the justification for each MEF’s ranking on the list and their 




 Shelter Overnight Operations – RTO: 12 hours – Priority A 
o Provision of overnight shelter to homeless persons is the primary mission of SITE. 
Failure to provide this service will have an impact on shelters users, the community, 
and other partner shelters who may receive anyone we must turn away. In addition, 
our funding contract with FUNDER allows us only one overnight period of closure, 
at which point we are expected to have solved the problem or established alternative 
service provision capabilities. 
 
MEF Details 
The following pages provide detail on the equipment, supply, staffing, time, facility, and other needs 
necessary to fulfill each MEF. The worksheet for each MEF will identify: 
 MEF Processes 
 MEF Outputs 
 MEF Inputs 
 Leadership Needs 
 Staffing Needs 
 IT/Communication Needs 
 Alternate Site Requirements 
 MEF Relocation Process 
 Equipment and Supply needs 
 Critical Records required for the MEF 
 Funding Sources for MEF continuity operations 
 Internal and External interdependencies  
 
[Insert the Business Process Analysis worksheets after this page – sort them by site and then priority order 











ORGANIZATION has thoroughly researched the natural, technological, and human-caused threats to 
operations at SITE. In summary, SITE is at risk from the following: 
 
[List identified site threats here in order of highest risk to lowest risk. Include the risk rating and reason 




Major Earthquake (6.0+) – High Risk: Although there is a low probability of an earthquake rating 6.0 or 
above at SITE, we cannot predict the event and it would cause significant damage to infrastructure and 
equipment needed to perform MEFs. It would also damage local roads, making relocation of services 
difficult as well. Estimated downtime for overnight shelter operations is a minimum of 4 hours to allow 
for a full damage assessment. Especially damaging events may require more time. Estimated damage 
costs are $XXXXX 
 
ORGANIZATION has developed controls in an effort to mitigate and, where possible, wholly prevent the 
causation and impacts of disrupting events. The following measures are in place to accomplish this goal” 
 
[List all of the controls that are in place here – procedural and physical. Any controls that are disabled, 
being installed, or otherwise unavailable should be noted with the date they were disabled. Update the list 




Access card entry to office area – prevents general public /clients from entering admin 
Smoke/CO detectors – Installed throughout site 
Sprinkler System – DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVE XX/XX/XXX 
CD backups of client files – CD backups are done once per week and are stored in the site manager’s 
office 






















EVENT RESPONSE PLANS 
During an event, its related response plan should be used. For emergency response procedures, please 
consult the emergency response plans. ORGANIZATION has a number of emergency response plans in 
place for SITE. These plans are located in a binder at SITE’S INTERNAL LOCATION. The master 
copies of these plans are located at ORGANIZATION’S INTERNAL LOCATION.  
 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
After the immediate effects of an event have ended or been contained, SITE’S damage assessment team 
will examine the building, equipment, and supplies for each MEF to determine site capabilities. If 
necessary, a member or members of the team will determine whether critical transportation routes are 
damaged or heavily impaired by traffic. SITE’S damage assessment team consists of: 
Damage Assessment Team 
Name Contact Info (All) Assignment 
Team member name Office/Cell/Email Supplies/Equipment/Bldg/Roads 
   
   
 
If the damage assessment team determines that SITE is incapable of performing any MEFs in its current 
condition, that function will be relocated to one of its alternate sites. If an alternate site must be activated, 
the continuity plan should be activated immediately.  
 
If a MEF’s operations are interrupted but can be restored on site before their associated RTO, staff should 
do so in priority order. Only MEFs that cannot be continued on site should be relocated. If any MEF will 
be out of commission for longer than its RTO, the continuity plan should be activated immediately. 
 
If the plan must be activated, contact [staff responsible for COOP operations for SITE] immediately at 
XXX-XXX-XXXX.  In the event that the COOP plan is activated, an emergency operations center should 
be set up at [SITE’s location for its EOC.] The following staff, or their alternates, should be contacted to 
inform them that the EOC has been activated: 
Emergency Operations Staff 
Position Name Contact Info (all) Alternates Alternates’ Contact 
Info 
Incident Leader     
Safety     
Liaison     
Public 
Information 
    
Operations     
 
(Note: the above list of positions is a sample – a real position list may combine positions, add positions, 




Continuity operations continue until MEF operations have been fully restored at either an alternate site or 
the primary site. The following pages show the existing procedures, staff, resource needs, and relevant 
contacts, for each type of event if it occurs at SITE.  
 
[At this point, the planner can insert the Continuity worksheets after this page in whatever order is 
preferred. If this plan is for multiple sites, sort by site first. Most of the worksheet information can be 
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broken down into tables for easier usage. Appendix B-12 - 19 contain blank worksheets if the planner 




Once it is determined that functions may resume at the original site or at an alternate facility, 
reconstitution begins. If SITE has been repaired or was not significantly damaged, any alternate sites will 
be shut down by staff and their functions will be transitioned back to the original site. If the original site is 
deemed unsuitable for continued operations, all operations will be transitioned to a new site.  
 
[Here the planner will insert the organization’s step-by-step transition plans] 
 
In the event that a suitable permanent site is not immediately available, a temporary site will be used until 
a new permanent location can be found.  
 
In either case, once MEFs have been transitioned and are fully operational at their original or new site, 
work will begin on the restoration of any deferred essential functions or unessential functions. Once all 
functions have been restored, and any alternate site has been shut down, continuity operations will end. 
The Emergency Relocation Group will be disbanded and create and after-action report for upper 





In the event that infrastructure or supplies are damaged and must be replaced, ORGANIZATION has the 
following plans in place: 
 
[The planner should insert their organization’s plan for recovering funds spent on repairs and 
replacements here. This can include insurance, funder reimbursement, donations, etc.] 
 
After Action Report 
 
After an event, the ERG will meet to discuss the event and examine how well the plan worked. This plan 
will address: 
 
 Staff performance and an analysis of staff training effectiveness 
 Equipment or supply problems 
 Problems in the plan processes 
 [Add any items that leadership wants as part of the AAR] 
 












Tests, Training, and Exercises 
 
ORGANIZATION plans to keep its employees and volunteers prepared to respond to events and perform 
their essential tasks under any circumstances. To facilitate this, ORGANIZATION has the current drills, 
training sessions, and exercises planned in YEAR: 
 
Date Type Subject Attendees Length 
1/1/2015 Drill Fire Response Test SITE staff 1hr 
2/1/2015 Training First Aid/CPR All staff 4hrs 





4/1/2015 Exercise (tabletop) Tornado Exercise ERG Only 5hrs 
     
 
[At this point, the planner should feel free to add any other important information they feel is needed for 
the plan. This can include lists of contact numbers for staff, locations of other staff, contact numbers for 




















Appendix D: Worksheets for Use with Appendix C 
D-1: Staff Listing – Include Regular Volunteers 
Position Name Contact Information Alternates Alternates 
Contact Info 
Site Manager     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     




D-2: Site Communication Needs  
Item Current Inventory Options for Replacements 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




















Site Address Setup Time 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      










D-4: Site Critical Equipment 
Equipment MEFs Applicable Replacement Inventory Replacement Options 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    









D-5: Site Critical Supplies 
Equipment MEFs Applicable Replacement Inventory Replacement Options 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
























       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       





























D-7: Approved Vendors/Stores 
Company Contact Name Contact 
Information 
Item Supplied Address for 
Pickups 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
















D-8: Funders/Partners/Other Contacts 
Organization Contact Name Contact Information Type of Contact 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
